The Impending Battle for Rafah

More than 100 Palestinians recently died when Israeli troops fired on a desperate crowd pulling food from an aid convoy in Gaza City. It brought the death toll in the ongoing conflict in the Gaza Strip to more than 30,000, threatened negotiations for a potential ceasefire between Israel and Hamas being brokered by the US, Qatar, and Egypt, and increased international condemnation as Israel prepares for its next major offensive that could lead to even greater civilian casualties. In the aftermath, the Biden administration announced that it would commence airdropping humanitarian supplies into Gaza illustrating the enormous ongoing human crisis and that relations between the United States and Israel are under enormous stress.

After nearly five months of war in Gaza, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have advanced to Rafah in the territory’s south, where about 1.4 million people are currently sheltering in what can only be described as a humanitarian disaster of near epic proportions. Over one million people in Rafah are refugees who fled their homes as the IDF invaded Gaza following the Hamas attack on October 7. Many have done so at the urging of Israeli forces and have already relocated several times during the fighting.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced he is delaying a planned IDF assault against the city temporarily, as he appears to pursue the ceasefire and the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas. President Biden has also said a ceasefire could occur soon and warned that an attack on Rafah would result in dramatic civilian casualties and cost Israel further international support.

Under the terms of the current ceasefire framework, according to media reports, Hamas would release about 40 hostages in exchange for a six-week ceasefire and the freeing of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners currently being held by Israel. Some Palestinians would also be allowed to return to their homes in northern Gaza. But this ceasefire, which will likely encompass the holy month of Ramadan (that begins on March 10), is not forever, according to the Israeli government.

Netanyahu has pledged that his forces will still enter Rafah, a city close to the border with Egypt, and argued that the US public will back Israel in response to Biden’s negative remarks about the potential offensive. He and other hardliners in the Israeli government believe Rafah is Hamas’ final stronghold, and the prime minister contended in an interview with CBS Face the Nation that once the operation begins Israel will be “weeks away, not months” from its goal of destroying Hamas and ending its devastating war in the Gaza Strip – which is at the cusp of becoming one of the deadliest for civilians since World War II.

In addition to 30,000 Palestinian dead there are 70,000 more who have been injured – most are women, children, and the elderly. An invasion of Rafah would cause those numbers to grow precipitously. The roughly 100 hostages still held by Hamas, who are believed to be in Rafah, are unlikely to survive Israel’s assault. Consequently, the impending “Battle of Rafah” is a major inflection point in this war, and it could have a significant bearing on the future of the Jewish state.

Netanyahu has said repeatedly that Israel’s goal is the total destruction of Hamas, but this remains a problematic contention. Hamas leaders are scattered throughout the Middle East, with a significant presence in Lebanon and Qatar. Even if Israel could destroy Hamas, it is a “movement,” and Israel may have “grown more” terrorists than it has neutralized. If Hamas were successfully destroyed physically, it likely would not take long for another militant group to take up its cause – particularly if thousands more die.

Netanyahu has said the IDF will present a plan to allow civilians in Rafah to evacuate safely prior to an attack. But so far, no plan has been presented, and it is unclear where they might be moved. Some media reports have suggested the IDF is considering allowing Palestinian civilians to pass through Israeli lines to areas north of Khan Younis and south of Gaza City. Moving these people out of harm’s way will be a monumental logistical and security task, however. It will require the establishment of safety corridors that must also ensure Hamas fighters aren’t allowed to flee or that weapons are not smuggled into areas previously secured by the IDF. Operational plans must also support humanitarian assistance to refugees during and after evacuation at a moment when some experts describe Gaza as an impending famine area.

The only thing Israeli officials have emphasized publicly is that they will not be pushed into Egypt, which is just south of Rafah. It is reported that the IDF chief of staff, Herzi Halevi, and the director of Israel’s security agency, Ronen Bar, visited their Egyptian counterparts in Cairo last week to further assure them that the Rafah operation will not lead to Palestinian refugees being forced into Egypt.

There could be major issues if there are. Israel and Egypt have had a peaceful security relationship since President Jimmy Carter brokered a 1979 treaty between them. Egypt has said that agreement, the backbone of Israeli security in the Middle East, would be ruptured if Palestinian refugees were forced into Egyptian territory. Egypt has already constructed a wall and additional barriers on the border to stop the movement of refugees into the country.

In the meantime, the plight of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip has become the greatest ongoing humanitarian crisis on the planet, and multiple international relief agencies (World Food Program, Doctors Without Borders, Oxfam, etc.) have continued to describe the situation in apocalyptic terms. Shortages of fresh water, food, and basic medical assistance have brought many Palestinians to the point of starvation. Relief supplies, if they arrive in the Gaza Strip at all, are only a tiny fraction of the current requirement. As Samantha Powers, the USAID administrator, noted on social media last week: “More than 500 trucks should be entering Gaza daily. In the past week only ~85/day managed to get through.”

The world community supported Israel in the immediate aftermath of the tragic and heinous attack by Hamas terrorists on October 7 that resulted in over 1,200 innocent Israeli dead. But since the start of the war, Netanyahu has refused to discuss the war’s aftermath and any type of longer-term political solution. Instead, he has suggested that the IDF will occupy Gaza to ensure Israeli security. Gaza will be demilitarized and the southern border with Egypt will be more tightly sealed. This will require Israel to deploy and maintain tens of thousands of troops in Gaza for an indefinite amount of time.

Some conservative Israeli government ministers have urged the expulsion of all two million Palestinian inhabitants from Gaza and filling the Strip with Jewish settlements. This effort has caused Israel to become even more isolated globally. Many nations have condemned the settlement dialogue and Israel’s military actions publicly, and several now refuse to provide them support.

Most importantly, however, it has strained the relationship between the US and Israel, and the one between Biden and Netanyahu. The two have known each other for more than 30 years, and Biden has been a staunch supporter of Israel throughout his political career. But the president, who is facing pressure from within his own party, is now describing Israel’s military operations as excessive.

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel as a sovereign state in 1948. Presidents from both parties have backed Israel in its conflicts with its Arab neighbors in 1956, 1967, and 1973. Washington has further supported Israel in multiple conflicts with Hamas in recent years. Israel, prior to this conflict, was one of the largest recipients of American military assistance – over $3 billion annually. But this conflict has put the “special relationship” between the two countries in jeopardy.

The White House is fully aware that this war could lead to expanded violence across the region. While strikes from Iran-backed groups in Iraq and Syria have declined since the US conducted major strikes in recent weeks, there continues to be multiple flashpoints. Hezbollah has continued artillery and missile attacks against Israel’s north, and there are now calls for a greater military response so the 80,000 Israelis who have fled the north can return home. The Houthis in Yemen continue attacks on commercial ships and US naval vessels in the Red Sea. There is also increased violence in the West Bank, which could worsen because of restrictions imposed on Muslims at the onset of Ramadan. Over 400 Palestinians have been killed in fighting with the IDF and Jewish settlers since October 7. Another 6,000 have been detained. All of these “fronts” in Israel’s ongoing war will likely intensify if it attacks Rafah.

Israelis are beginning to call for elections and the removal of Netanyahu. The Israeli economy is now suffering from rising unemployment, reduced credit ratings, gross domestic product has shrunk dramatically, and several major companies have departed. Previous wars that Israel fought were brief in comparison, as this war drags on concerns are rising about how long Israel can keep 300,000 reservists in uniform.

Biden has publicly expressed confidence that there will be a ceasefire soon and must privately hope that this will translate into an end to hostilities. Perhaps that is the case, and the Israelis have telegraphed their intention to attack Rafah to buttress their negotiating strategy to secure the release of hostages. What is certain, however, is that this war is at an inflection point, and the path ahead will have dramatic implications for the future of Israel, the region, and the globe.

Jeff McCausland is a national security consultant for CBS Radio and TV and a Visiting Professor at Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. He is a retired Colonel from the US Army having commanded during the Gulf War and served in the Pentagon as well as on the National Security Council staff in the White House. He is the Founder and CEO of Diamond6 Leadership and Strategy, LLC. (www.diamondsixleadership.com)

The worst implications of Trump’s 'America First' isolationism are coming into focus

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Donald Trump’s apparent disconnect from reality during a challenging time in global history exposes the stakes of this year’s presidential election.

During a recent campaign rally, Donald Trump said he told a NATO leader he would “encourage” Russia “to do whatever the hell they want” to countries that were “delinquent” and had not paid bills they “owed” the alliance. His remarks set off a firestorm domestically and internationally, as the U.S. Congress argues over how and when to provide Ukraine with additional military assistance in its efforts to halt Russian aggression.

This situation was exacerbated by the sudden death of Alexei Navalny in a Russian Arctic penal colony. Navalny was a long-standing opponent of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s dictatorial rule. The Kremlin had even attempted to poison Navalny in 2020 and jailed him on trumped up charges upon his return to Russia in 2021. Despite these facts, Trump refused to condemn Putin. Instead he compared his own extensive and ongoing legal struggles to Navalny’s struggle for freedom in Russia, casting himself as a victim.


Read full article here on MSNBC.

Train Wreck: The Congress, the Defense Budget, and National Security

The U.S. nearly plunged into its fourth government shutdown in 10 years, a troubling development avoided by a Continuing Resolution (CR) that passed with just hours to spare. House Speaker Kevin McCarthy had failed to whip his Republican conference and right-wing members into a consistent voting bloc to pass the FY2024 Federal Budget and had to seek support from Democrats to secure a CR. Now he has 45 more days to find a solution, but it is likely the nation will be in the same predicament when the current deal expires. Leaders in the White House and Wall Street had warned that the nation’s economy would suffer from a shutdown, and this may have contributed to action at the eleventh hour. But in the aftermath, right-wing GOP members are preparing to oust McCarthy from leadership and appear uninterested in compromise.

The last shutdown occurred in 2018-19 and ended after more than 35 days. Given the level of acrimony and a potential drawn out battle for congressional leadership posts, it appears very possible that a shutdown in this Congress could test that record.

But the country’s national security is also at risk. McCarthy and his caucus failed to pass the fiscal 2024 Pentagon spending bill after numerous votes, which clearly has major implications for the country’s defense. One major obstacle for Congress has been aid to Ukraine. The Senate, on a bipartisan basis, proposed sending $6 billion in military aid to Ukraine, but House Republicans made it clear that was a nonstarter. Right-wing members of the House even balked at including $300 million targeted at training Ukrainian soldiers and the purchase of weapons in the CR. While a tiny amount in terms of the overall budget, even that small number was considered a poison pill.

Thus far the U.S. has provided $46 billion in military aid, and the administration is seeking $24 billion more. President Joe Biden made it clear that Ukraine funding remains a top priority to him, and he issued a statement that bluntly pointed the finger at Congress to figure it out.

"We cannot under any circumstances allow American support for Ukraine to be interrupted," he said. "I fully expect the Speaker will keep his commitment to the people of Ukraine and secure passage of the support needed to help Ukraine at this critical moment."

Democrats and Republicans will have to come together to pass further funding for Kyiv. It may take quite a bit of time to get there, however. Congress still needs to figure out how to ensure the Pentagon remains funded for FY2024, and a CR still hinders America’s ability to secure its national security interests.

The CR will not allow for increases in munition production without a waiver, and in the past, this has affected the production lines of the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System and Patriot missiles, William LaPlante, the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, said last week.

LaPlante also warned that a shutdown would be “horrible” and halt weapon system testing, the government’s ability to accept finished military equipment from manufacturers as well as acquisition/sustainment projects. He noted, glibly, that China’s military does not suffer through continuing resolutions or government shutdowns.

“Can you imagine if the Chinese had something like this, where their government would shut down every few years, and they would freeze their budgets?” he said to a crowd at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “We would not view that badly. We could teach them how to do that. That would be helpful.”

The crowd laughed in response, but without the passage of the defense budget and the $886 billion that President Joe Biden requested there is real concern that a shutdown will dramatically affect the nation’s security in a variety of ways. Personnel costs, procurement, research and development, maintenance and operations are all at risk. A lack of funding would also negatively affect American prestige abroad and unity with our allies. Not to mention, it raises significant questions about our continued support for Taiwan as well as Ukraine’s counteroffensive. All are intrinsically tied to the nation’s security and its position in the world.

Personnel

If a November shutdown were to occur, obviously the most dramatic effect would be on soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines who will not be paid. There are 2more than 2 million military personnel (roughly 1.3 million active-duty soldiers, plus another 800,000 reservists) who are required to continue to perform their duties and, like in past shutdowns, will receive back pay once it is over. There are also 804,244 DoD civilians. About 45% are deemed “essential” and would continue to work during a shutdown. They as well as those furloughed would receive back pay in the aftermath. Government contractors, however, are not guaranteed back pay.

Many junior military personnel live paycheck to paycheck, and roughly 20% of junior enlisted families live in homes that are food insecure. Consequently, any interruption of pay means thousands of suffering military families who will struggle to buy groceries, and pay rent, car payments, mortgages, childcare, etc. In a recent survey, 54% of junior enlisted military families said they would be “greatly affected” by a shutdown. One-third of these families have less than $3,000 in savings. Even grocery stores on military bases, called commissaries, and childcare centers will likely close and elective surgeries and dentistry will pause.

This would also have a negative impact on military recruiting and the retention of highly qualified military personnel. It occurs at a particularly difficult moment as all the services have failed to meet their FY2023 recruiting goals. It is impossible to believe that the failure of Congress to pay the troops will encourage more young Americans to enlist in its aftermath.

Procurement and R&D

LaPlante also warned that a shutdown would cause the country’s military procurement and research and development efforts to grind to a halt. He recalled that as head of Air Force Acquisition during a previous shutdown he had to furlough all employees from the Defense Contracting Management Agency. This group examines new equipment prior to acceptance by the military, and this essentially froze F-35 fighter and munition production lines. We will likely see some manufacturing freezes due to the CR particularly with respect to any new programs or the expansion of previous programs.

Defense industries are well aware of the significant challenges caused by a shutdown or CR.

Aerospace and major defense companies have more than 2 million employees, and the industry's lead trade group, AIA, said last week that it wants Congress to “act now to fund the federal government…especially for the Department of Defense, as well as the Federal Aviation Administration and NASA.” They cite national security and aviation safety as their major concern, but it obviously has major business implications as well.

If a shutdown continued for an extended period, it would impact these industries. A CR, meanwhile, stops any expansion of manufacturing. Existing major procurements (ships, aircraft, missiles, etc.) are multiyear contracts as is ongoing construction. Consequently, they are unlikely to be affected. But items like the production of munitions, particularly artillery rounds, have been a single-year budget line. Because of the growing demand brought about by the Ukraine war, the U.S. has sought to resurrect its defense industrial base to meet the dramatic demand for ammunition. A shutdown would bring those new production lines to a halt, but a Continuing Resolution effectively does the same.

Beyond the immediate effect, a shutdown and even the CR could further discourage industry from expanding manufacturing lines as promised. As a result, the Pentagon may pursue multi-year contracts to avoid future issues for industry, which is not an approach favored by Congress. Typically, lawmakers on Capitol Hill have sought greater oversight of such contracts because of the impact they have on individual states or constituencies.

In the Air Force alone, there could be major challenges for key modernization initiatives that are still in research and development. For example, the Air Force has a new program to convert F-16s to be compatible with artificial intelligence (AI). The experimental operations unit, which is tasked with testing the new capability as part of Project Venom, is slated to get $72 million in the fiscal 2024 budget. But because it’s a new program, a CR means the program cannot begin until a new budget passes.

Operations and Maintenance

Failure to pass the defense budget will also affect ongoing military operations and training. Military exercises that are not within the current budget may need to be curtailed or cancelled. It could also curtail the ability of the U.S. military to perform new support missions along the U.S. border and to maintain equipment and other assets. Ironically, a shutdown, which some hardline Republicans were openly supportive of pursuing, could undermine many things that Freedom Caucus Republicans staunchly claim to defend by draining resources for border security and increasing overall costs.

Whether in a shutdown or under a CR, there will be some waivers for ongoing operations and training. The Pentagon previously announced that it would not pause the training of Ukrainian soldiers in the United during a shutdown, for example, as it falls under one of the excepted activities that can still be pursued. Still, this effort cannot be expanded absent a new budget which could slow the training of Ukrainian pilots to fly the promised F-16 fighters. A shutdown or a budget freeze also threatens a major multibillion-dollar diplomatic agreement between the U.S. and three key Pacific Island nations that are a cornerstone of the Biden administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. The administration has stated that the renewal of decades-old “compacts of free association” (COFAs) with the Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau are the “bedrock of the U.S. role in the Pacific.” Consequently, it has sought to respond to growing Chinese influence by expanding U.S. access to military bases and improved diplomatic ties with countries in the region.

Conclusions

This last-minute budget deal is a further indicator of how political battles in Washington undermine America’s national security as well as its international presence and reputation with allies abroad. Unfortunately, there is every reason to believe the nation will be at this same point on November 17th .

Furthermore, both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jingping are enjoying the disarray in the U.S. Congress. Both will likely use this as a clear illustration that democracy is in decline and the superiority of their respective political systems.

Some congressmen attempted to minimize the possibility that Congress might fail to pass the Federal Budget resulting in a government shutdown. Representative Andy Biggs of Arizona claimed during the budget effort that this would “not be a shutdown of government,” but a pause in “out-of-control federal spending related to nonessentials.” This is at best naïve and at worst uninformed. He might well consider the words of our second president, John Adams who said that “facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passion, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”

The War in Ukraine - Growing Threats of Escalation

Opinions shared about the war in Ukraine have been plentiful and wide ranging. Many of those views were wrong in the initial stages of the war, but at this point what everyone can agree upon is that this conflict will undoubtedly take years to resolve — and the toll of this war will not decrease soon. After more than a year and a half the conflict is now entering a new and more dangerous phase. The war is escalating with respect to geography, global implications, and weapons employed. This is occurring while Western populations are becoming increasingly weary of this war.

U.S. officials announced earlier this month that the number of casualties is roughly 500,000. Russia has suffered 120,000 dead and more than 170,000 wounded. Ukraine’s casualty rate is lower: around 70,000 killed and more than 100,000 wounded. Russia’s larger population could give it greater staying power, but Ukrainian resolve appears unshaken.

The conflict expands

The Biden administration’s hopes of confining the war to the territory of Ukraine is failing. Kyiv is launching more and more drones into Russian territory in an effort to bring the war to the Russian people in response to the massive drone and missile attacks Ukraine has suffered. Ukraine launched its largest drone attack since the war began on Wednesday, focusing the barrage on military targets. Kyiv has also conducted additional strikes on the Kerch Bridge to isolate Crimea and sought to achieve a psychological blow with drone attacks on the Kremlin and Moscow.

The Black Sea has become a theatre of conflict after the Kremlin cancelled the grain agreement, potentially drawing in other countries into the war. At the same time, Africa may also witness more proxy conflicts between Russia and the West.

NATO also faces growing concerns on its eastern flank: Belarus and the remnants of the Wagner Group. Since Yevgeny Prigozhin’s failed mutiny, it has been difficult to predict what would come next for the mercenary group. Would Russia integrate Wagner into its own forces? Would Putin allow Prigozhin to continue to lead this force independent of Kremlin supervision? Would they allow the Wagner leader to survive? The demise of Prigozhin and much of Wagner’s senior leadership appears to have answered some of those questions, though what it means for Wagner’s operations in Belarus and Africa remains unclear.

Poland and the Baltic States, all NATO member, have been outspoken that the presence of several thousand Wagner group fighters in Belarus and threatening rhetoric by Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko present a growing security challenge. As a result, Poland ordered several thousand troops to its border, as Wagner fighters conducted military exercises near the Polish and Lithuanian borders. Most NATO experts argue that there is little chance of an outright invasion, but Wagner mercenaries could conduct sabotage operations. These exercises were conducted close to Suwalki Gap which is a narrow strip of land that separates Belarus from the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad on the Baltic Sea — a region of great strategic value. If a conflict did occur, military experts believe Russia would seek to seize this terrain to isolate the Baltic Republics.

This may be an effort by Lukashenko to just be provocative, but it could have more to do with impending national elections in Poland. The current ruling party (Law and Justice) has described itself as the defender of Polish sovereignty. But Lukashenko’s goading raises the possibility of a miscalculation that could result in disaster.

Moscow’s efforts to maintain if not expand its influence in Africa following the death of Prigozhin suggests that conflict may increase in Africa as well. Russia may seek to benefit from the recent coup in Niger which displaced a democratically elected leader supported by the West. Furthermore, the Kremlin is seeking to replace Prigozhin with a new leader that is loyal to Putin for the thousands of Russian mercenaries currently operating in Mali, Chad, Libya, and the Central African Republic. The Kremlin has also expanded economic and political efforts in Burkina Faso, Algeria, Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Eritrea.

The Niger coup is a particular embarrassment for the United States and its allies. Washington largely trained the Niger army and currently has 1,100 soldiers in the country. But the implications are potentially even more catastrophic. There have now been seven coups across central Africa since 2020, and a growing possibility of a regional war. Moscow is likely pursuing a “hybrid warfare campaign” that seeks to synergize military operations, criminality, refugees, and economic benefit. The dislocation such social unrest and civil wars engender has already dramatically increased the refugee flow to Europe, creating a political and immigration crisis.

Increasing Global Concerns

Though Western economies are experiencing increasing stability since the pandemic, the war’s growing economic effects are mounting. The Russian economy is increasingly suffering, forcing the central bank to raise interest rates by 3.5% to 12% in a single day. This has serious implications for Russia’s growth and development and brought about a 17-month low for the ruble.

Meanwhile, Kyiv has employed naval drones against Russian ships raising the possibility of reducing Moscow’s ability to export grains, fertilizer, and oil from its ports in the Black Sea. This could have major global implications. More than 3% of the world’s supply of oil moves through the Black Sea. Roughly 750,000 barrels of Russian crude oil per day were historically shipped from Russian Black Sea ports, though that has already reduced to between 400,000 and 575,000 barrels a day. State Department energy experts estimate that prices could rise $10 to $15 per barrel if Russia is prevented from using the Black Sea to export oil.

While the Ukrainians have attempted to create safe corridors for maritime travel via the Black Sea, the Russians are also seeking to destroy Ukrainian grain destined for export as well as the port infrastructure that is critical to the Ukrainian economy.

This has threatened NATO members located on the shores of the Black Sea: Bulgaria, Romania, and Turkey. Ukraine has increasingly depended on Romania to export its grain via the Danube River through its Izmail and Reni ports. These three NATO countries have immense economic interests tied to the Black Sea. These developments could draw them into the conflict and force NATO to increase its force posture in the region.

Russia’s efforts to destroy Ukrainian grain and infrastructure will have a significant effect on wheat and other commodity prices. Ukraine has historically accounted for over 10% of the global wheat market and exported 33 million metric tons of grain since it brokered the agreement with Russia via the United Nations and Turkey. If Kyiv struggles to export wheat, corn, barley, and sunflower, it could cause famine in some countries in Africa and the Middle East.

A peace summit in Saudi Arabia demonstrated growing global concerns but appears to have done little to find a path to peace. Ukraine attended, along with 40 other countries, but Russia did not. China and India both sent representatives, and many other states in attendance would be significantly affected by a reduction in Ukrainian grain exports. The event did demonstrate the growing global concern about the war’s economic impact, humanitarian challenges as well as growing threats to nuclear security, the environment, and food distribution.

Expanding Violence, Weaponry, and the Nuclear Question

From the onset of this conflict, NATO has sought to calibrate its military assistance to Ukraine with an eye on how such support might be construed as escalation by Moscow. As the war continued, many of the qualms NATO allies had at the onset have faded, as members have agreed to provide F16 fighter aircraft and long-range missiles. The U.S. has also provided the controversial cluster munitions.

In response Moscow has become more indiscriminate in missile and drone strikes against populated areas. Russia has increasingly employed “two tap strikes” on Ukrainian cities. The first attack on a residential area will be followed by a second attack about 40 minutes later to also kill or injure first responders.

Moscow has created a massive ecological disaster with the destruction of the Kakhovka Dam and fears remain that Russia might orchestrate a disaster at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, the largest such plant in Europe, which Moscow’s forces control. President Vladimir Putin has also continued to openly threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a clear attempt to intimidate the West.

But Putin has also gone beyond rhetoric. He has ordered the movement of Russian tactical nuclear weapons into Belarus, and Russian doctrine for the use of such weapons is substantially different from the United States, which emphasizes the use of a nuclear weapon as a last resort. Still, it is hard to imagine a scenario where a nuclear strike would not result in enormous negative strategic results for Russia for, at best, limited tactical gains. The possibility Russia might escalate to nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out, however. Still one of the casualties of the Ukraine war is nuclear arms control. The last remaining treaty that limits Russian and American strategic nuclear weapons (New START) will expire in February 2026. It is very unlikely to be renewed which will likely result in a new nuclear arms race that may be more difficult to stop than during the Cold War.

Political Dynamic at Home

Western weariness with the war is illustrated in the ongoing U.S. presidential campaign. Three major Republican presidential candidates — Donald Trump, Vivek Ramaswamy, and Ron DeSantis — have either been noncommittal about their support for Ukraine or opposed to providing further assistance.

The U.S.’s financial assistance to Kyiv has been substantial: $113 billion in military, economic and humanitarian aid. But that support was provided under a budgetary authority outlined by Congress prior to the Republican Party securing a majority in the 2022 elections. Most of those funds are now gone, and President Biden has requested an additional $24 billion in military assistance that the House and Senate will consider when they return from recess in September.

This will undoubtedly be a contentious debate. Seventy House Republicans voted to end Ukraine military assistance in July, and some argue that additional funding for Ukraine would violate the budget caps agreed upon as part of the resolution of the debt ceiling issue in June.

Putin will enjoy this political turmoil in the United States, as he clearly believes his willpower is stronger than Washington and its allies. As the United States enters a presidential election year, the Ukraine war will be a major campaign issue — and it should be. But politicizing what is now the most important foreign policy challenge the United States faces is extremely dangerous. How this conflict is resolved will have a profound effect on both American interests and global stability for decades to come.

Negotiations OR “'Havoc! and let slip the dogs of war."

War has once again come to the Middle East following a surprise attack on Israel by Hamas emanating from the Gaza Strip. Hamas’s attack occurred on the 50th anniversary, nearly to the day, of the 1973 Yom Kippur War when Israel was similarly surprised by an Egyptian attack. As of Monday morning, the death toll has passed 1,100 people in Israel and Gaza — at least 11 Americans are among the dead —thousands more are wounded, and Hamas has taken over one hundred hostages. Israel has pounded Gaza with airstrikes in response and secured villages in its territory that were temporarily held by Hamas. More than 123,000 people in Gaza are displaced by the violence and the Israel Defense Forces have called up 300,000 reservists to respond to the hostilities. “We are embarking on a long and difficult war that was forced on us by a murderous Hamas attack,” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Sunday. This conflict could be dire for diplomatic efforts in the region.

Prior to the conflict, President Joe Biden had sought to broker an agreement between Israel and Saudi Arabia that would establish diplomatic ties. This was always going to be a very demanding diplomatic effort, but now it is much more difficult — and even more crucial. This occurred despite Biden’s somewhat frosty relationship with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS). The president criticized Netanyahu for undemocratic efforts to reform the Israeli judiciary and the harsh treatment of Palestinians. Biden also called Saudi Arabia a “pariah” during the 2020 president campaign. He threatened to release intelligence about MBS’s role in the assassination of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, expressed strong opposition to the Saudis’ war in Yemen and threatened “consequences” when MBS allowed oil prices to rise ahead of the 2022 midterm election. Despite these facts, the administration’s effort to convince Saudi Arabia to enter the so-called Abraham Accords and establish formal diplomatic relations with Israel appeared to be gaining traction.

This geopolitical earthquake would shake up the Middle East, illustrate America’s determination to maintain a regional leadership role and forestall growing Chinese influence. Washington had been surprised when China brokered an agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, two longtime enemies, earlier this year and realizes Saudi Arabia is the PRC’s main energy supplier. An agreement, especially now, would be a major foreign policy October 12, 2023 Negotiations OR “'Havoc! and let slip the dogs of war." achievement for Biden ahead of the 2024 elections. But success here means that the interests of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and Israel must be satisfied.

The view from Jerusalem

Israel would gain enormously by normalizing ties with Saudi Arabia: fewer security concerns, increased stability in the Middle East, a regional ally to further deter Iranian aggression and expanded economic opportunities. An agreement would mean the leading military power in the region (Israel) would be tied to the leading economic power (Saudi Arabia). But Israel would need to make concessions which are made more difficult due to the ongoing conflict. The U.S. has urged Netanyahu to halt his government’s ongoing judicial overhaul that has resulted in massive social unrest across Israel. Many American experts believe these efforts endanger long term relations between Washington and Tel Aviv. But as the crisis began the White House immediately has made clear its full support for Israel.

Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin ordered the redeployment of an aircraft carrier strike group and air assets closer to Israel, and the United States will provide Jerusalem with munitions and other military supplies. This will mean the demand on the U.S. defense industrial base will continue to skyrocket. The political situation in Israel could also change rapidly, affecting negotiations. Already Netanyahu’s has discussed creating a government of national unity with Opposition Leader Yair Lapid and former Defense Minister Benny Gantz, who leads the National Unity Party following the attack. Netanyahu faces growing criticism for a catastrophic intelligence failure and what some Israelis view as a slow military response. Biden as well as Saudi Arabia sought Israeli concessions on the Palestinian issue. These proposals would be opposed by Netanyahu’s right-wing allies and could prove politically problematic for Biden as the hostilities continue.

The White House wanted Israel to return to a two-state solution that requires a freeze in new Jewish settlements, create areas for new Palestinians settlements, and expanded Palestinian control over the Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem. But concessions are unlikely while the fighting continues. If the war is short, Hamas suffers a resounding defeat and evidence of the Israeli government’s massive intelligence failure is revealed, political conditions may change, however. In 1973, the Meir government was similarly surprised by an Egyptian attack. Though successful in battle, the government fell six months later in popular recrimination over the government’s intelligence failures. This set the stage for an eventual rapprochement with Egypt. But at this moment both Israeli and American officials do not expect the war to end quickly. Squandering a historic opportunity could be equally threatening to the Israeli prime minister’s hold on power.

Netanyahu would be in the uncomfortable position of rejecting an agreement that would likely be popular among voters, as it could help bring peace and forestall future Iranian aggression – Tehran is the shared enemy of Saudi Arabia and Israel and some suspect Iranian involvement in Hamas’s attack. In the aftermath of the conflict, domestic pressure will likely rise against Netanyahu and force him to call for new elections, create the previously mentioned national unity government or be ousted from a position that he appears determined to cling to. Time will tell.

The view from Riyadh

The Saudis want security guarantees equivalent to U.S. NATO partners, help with its civil nuclear energy program and some concessions for the Palestinian in return for normalization. Riyadh’s greatest security concern remains Iran. The two countries are divided along religious lines and have long sought to be the region’s dominant power. The U.S.-Saudi relationship is crucial to Riyadh’s need to deter future threats emanating from Tehran and its broader goals in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, common interests exist.

The attack by Hamas underscores that both Israel and Saudi Arabia are embroiled in conflicts with Iranian proxies. Israel is at war with Hamas, which annually receives $100 million in military aid from Iran and immediately received verbal support from Tehran. Saudi Arabia is still in conflict with Houthi rebels in Yemen supported by Tehran as well as Iranian surrogates in Syria and Iraq. Experts speculate Iran encouraged this conflict to prevent an American brokered normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia was quick to denounce Hamas’s attack, but complexities remain. A Palestinian state has been a driving mission of the Arab world for years.

Powerful older generations in Saudi Arabia, such as MBS’s father King Salman, are deeply invested in returning Israeli-held lands to the Palestinians. Perhaps unsurprisingly a Saudi Foreign Ministry statement foreshadowed increased diplomatic challenges. it blamed the violence on Israel’s “continued occupation, the deprivation of the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights, and the repetition of systemic provocations against its sanctities.” MBS has previously said he was open to negotiating with Netanyahu’s right-wing government if the Palestinian issue was addressed. "If we have a breakthrough, reaching a deal that gives the Palestinians their needs and [that makes] the region calm, we've got to work with whoever's there," he said. The White House must now find new ways to satisfy Saudi and Israeli interests.

It is very unlikely Saudis will obtain an American “ironclad” security guarantee, but could get a “softer” commitment of an American response if Saudi Arabia was directly attacked. Still, many in Washington are deeply skeptical of the Saudis and wants to ensure that the United States is not drawn into conflicts started by the kingdom, such as its war in Yemen. The Saudis have always been fearful that Tehran might develop a nuclear weapon. MBS was always skeptical of the “Iran Nuclear Deal,” and said he will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. He recently emphasized that if Iran obtained a weapon, his country would "have to get one, for security reasons, for balancing power."

As an alternative, Saudi Arabia has proposed coming under the American “nuclear umbrella.” Currently this “extended deterrence” is enjoyed by NATO members and close American allies in the Pacific: Japan, South Korea and Australia. Riyadh also wants Washington to support its civilian nuclear program. MBS believes transitioning the Saudi energy economy, a cornerstone of his Vision 2030, is essential. He considers it an aid against terrorist threats and an opportunity for the country’s growing population. But MBS also wants to enrich active material in Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. has never previously agreed to in similar agreements, and experts fear this could eventually help Riyadh develop its own nuclear weapons. Saudi officials have proposed a compromise that would establish a “nuclear Aramco” as a joint U.S.-Saudi project with greater American oversight. But MBS would also need to make additional commitments: ratification of the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), American/IAEA inspections of facilities, as well as electronic monitoring. Thus far, MBS has declined to act on these proposals.

Congress and the view from Washington

Washington obviously desires to secure U.S. interests in the region and counter Russian and Chinese influence. It is worth nothing that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad recently inked a “strategic partnership” with Beijing, Kuwait’s crown prince visited with Xi Jinping, and $23.4 billion in deals were signed at the ChinaArab Trade Expo. Moscow also maintains ties with Riyadh and other oil-producing countries in the region through OPEC+, which directly impacts Western gas prices. Any agreement that is framed as a treaty, would require a two-third vote in the Senate, another challenge. Even Senate Democrats have expressed concern about a deal. Twenty senators sent a letter to the White House saying their support was dependent on a halt to expanded Israeli settlements in Palestinian territories and preservation of “a two-state solution.” Senators also raised concerns that a defense treaty with Saudi Arabia could enmesh the U.S. in the Middle East further. These are clearly fair arguments, particularly now.

Conclusions

The complexities of global conflict are expanding almost on a daily basis which may undermine parts of Biden’s ambitious foreign policy. Still, in three years, this White House ended the nation’s involvement in its longest war, resurrected the NATO alliance to confront Russia, and reconfigured the security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region to respond to China and North Korea. Any deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia would be an immense feather in the administration’s cap, especially now. Negotiations appeared to be progressing in small but not insignificant ways prior to the Hamas attack. Israeli planes are allowed overflight rights over Saudi Arabia, an Israeli cabinet minister recently visited the kingdom — the first time this has ever happened — and an Israel official provided another first by conducting a Jewish prayer service in Saudi Arabia. Secretary of State Blinken was reported to be preparing to visit Israel as part of these negotiations.

But the current war demonstrates once again that long term peace in the region can only be achieved by addressing the Palestinian issue. The next few weeks will determine whether the “dogs of war” triumph over another attempt at Middle East stability. Choices made now could decide whether we see a long-term conflict that perhaps expands in both geography and protagonists or if diplomacy and negotiations are given a chance. As Biden said over the weekend, “the world is watching.”

NATO Summit

Before NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg met with the NATO members in Vilnius, Lithuania, earlier this month, he outlined in an article for Foreign Affairs magazine his objectives. The meeting was slated to be particularly vital. Since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the allies had telegraphed its importance for months. This was especially true as the Ukrainians were demanding a pathway to join the collective defense organization.

To Stoltenberg, the objectives were clear. He aimed to bring together a multiyear package of support for Ukraine, tie Kyiv closer to NATO, ensure the defense organization acted as a buttress against authoritarianism, adapt command structures to reflect the new geography of the alliance after Finland and Sweden joined NATO, increase cooperation with defense industries across Europe and the US to increase production, and do as much as possible to achieve greater strategic alignment, enhance deterrence, and improve overall defense capabilities.

“We need to invest more and invest it now, because security is the foundation for our economies and societies to thrive,” Stoltenberg wrote. “Preventing aggression today is less costly than fighting a war tomorrow.”

At his closing press conference, Stoltenberg celebrated the achievement of those objectives, which would help NATO “adapt our Alliance for the future.” The Vilnius Summit appears to have done just that. NATO adopted the most detailed and robust defense plans since the Cold War, made new commitments to defense investment, provided additional support for Ukraine, and created a new effort to transition Ukrainian military equipment from the Soviet era to NATO standards – which includes Kyiv acquiring F-16 fighter jets as well as the associated training and logistical support. The allies also negotiated an end to Turkey’s blockade of Sweden’s membership application, ensuring the Nordic state would soon join the defense organization. Member states also made a clear commitment that Ukraine would join NATO once the ongoing conflict had ended.

For the Western allies to commit and agree to so much made it one of the most consequential and effective summits in the alliance’s history and a strong rebuttal to Russia’s efforts. Still, it must be acknowledged that Ukrainian leaders expressed clear disappointment over a disconnect among allies that left Kyiv viewing their path forward as vague.

With that in mind, what are the particulars of a summit that proved to be so vital and why did Ukraine leave appearing upset? How does this prepare the Alliance for the future during the largest conflict in Europe since World War II?

Turkey Ends Block of Sweden Application

That the meeting kicked off with the news that Turkey, which has the second largest military in the alliance, would end its yearlong blockade of Sweden’s membership application is very significant. Sweden had originally applied with Finland in April 2022 following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The two countries had maintained their neutrality between the Kremlin and the West since the onset of the Cold War, but Moscow’s war of aggression served to alter their historic strategic posture. Finland was accepted into the alliance earlier this year, but Turkey objected to Sweden’s bid as the prevailing view in Ankara was that Sweden supported Kurdish groups that Turkey considered terrorists. The Kurds, a Muslim minority group, make up about a fifth of Turkey’s population and have a sordid and, at times, violent history with the Turkish government.

In response, Sweden amended its constitution, changed laws with respect to terrorism, and expanded its counterterror cooperation against the Kurdish militant group, the Kurdistan Workers Party. That still was not enough for Turkish President Erdogan. Stockholm also resumed arms exports to Turkey and made a new bilateral security compact with Ankara. NATO further committed to increasing its overall counterterror efforts and created the post of special coordinator for counterterrorism. But none of that appeared to be truly persuasive to Erdogan who had used this issue during his successful reelection campaign in May. He had portrayed himself as a populist who was the defender of Turkish nationalism.

It is widely believed that the U.S. decision to sell Turkey F-16 fighter jets convinced Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan that he had extracted the most concessions he was likely to receive and resulted in his decision to clear the way for Sweden’s membership. Senator Bob Menendez, the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, remains opposed to the F-16 fighter jet deal publicly, and had long held up any agreement with Turkey. But behind the scenes it appears his longstanding blockade of a fighter jet sale to Ankara was resolved. U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, former Republican senator of Arizona, is said to have flown regularly between Washington and Turkey to help smooth his former colleague’s concerns, which included recent Turkish incursions into Greek airspace. Menendez told CNN that for a deal to work, he would need to see “less hostility to a fellow NATO ally” – meaning Greece – “commitment that the tranquility that has existed over the last several months continues,” and “no use of US weapons against another NATO ally.”

During the summit, many were watching any announcements that might follow a meeting between Erdogan and Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis in Vilnius. The visit between the country’s leaders appears to have been aimed at resolving disagreements between the two NATO members, which includes a historic territorial dispute in North Cyprus.

While it now appears Sweden has met all necessary requirements, the deliverables of the apparent deal will proceed slowly. Menendez reiterated his opposition to the deal last week, and Erdogan said the Turkish parliament would not consider Stockholm’s accession until it returns from recess in October.

Is Ukraine’s glass half full?

Many believe Ukraine should have much to be happy about with new military commitments to its defense, additional military aid, and a clear statement from all 31 NATO nations that its “future is in NATO.” And yet the Ukrainians could not hide that they were disgruntled that the summit did not offer Kyiv any specifics or a timetable to membership.

Hours before he arrived at the summit, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy telegraphed that he knew what was coming and blasted NATO’s leadership in a tweet. “It’s unprecedented and absurd when a time frame is not set, neither for the invitation nor for Ukraine’s membership,” he wrote before arriving in Vilnius. By the end of the meeting, Zelenskyy’s tune had changed after closed door discussions with key alliance members, including President Joe Biden. Reportedly, the outburst nearly backfired on the Ukrainian leader.

While the pathway is admittedly vague, NATO has removed a step from the process (eliminating the so-called Membership Action Plan), promised to continue its support of Ukraine in its war with Russia, and said alliance member’s foreign ministers would regularly check on Ukraine’s progress toward NATO standards regarding democratization, addressing corruption and military integration. Furthermore, the Alliance announced a NATO-Ukraine Defense Council that would allow Kyiv to consult directly with NATO members on policy and strategic issues. Nevertheless, it was clear Kyiv wanted more.

Clearly, Ukraine cannot be granted entry into NATO immediately. If it were, it would immediately trigger Article V of the NATO Treaty and force all members to join the war against Russia. There is also the need for each NATO member state’s parliament or congress to vote in favor of a new member which is what occurred with the admission of Finland and is pending for Sweden. But Kyiv’s current status remains problematic, and even a “frozen conflict” would keep Ukraine’s borders undefined — which would complicate its membership further. Still, Poland and the Baltic States were seeking a clear statement that Ukraine would be given membership as soon as the war ended, as they continued to push for NATO to adopt a stronger response to Russian aggression.

Ukraine’s concerns are twofold. First, there is a growing belief that Kyiv is fighting a war for all of Europe, but it is left without assurances or equal status. Second, Ukrainian leaders worry their membership application could be negotiated away in a diplomatic settlement with Moscow, and Ukraine become a “buffer state.” There is also a fear that Russia could prolong the conflict to prevent Kyiv’s entry if NATO does not provide Kyiv a clear path to membership and the collective security guarantee. After all, Ukraine likely understands better than most that, as Winston Churchill once said, “The only thing worse than fighting a war with allies is fighting a war without allies.”

While their concerns are reasonable — after all Ukrainian national security interests were ignored in past agreements that provided vague security guarantees — it remains remarkable that thirty-one member states were able to agree on a statement that committed as much as it did to Kyiv. The Ukrainians could have come away from Vilnius in a much more tenuous position.

A new Cold War

At the conclusion of the summit, President Biden invoked Europe’s momentous history and compared Ukraine’s war with Russia to the Cold War, which tormented the continent for decades. Despite the comparison and yearlong commitment that it illustrated, he maintained that the U.S. and NATO support “will not waiver.” The speech seemed aimed at preparing allies, partners, and the public for a long war. This may have also been intended to dampen expectations for the much discussed Ukrainian counteroffensive.

“Putin still wrongly believes that he can outlast Ukraine,” Biden said during a speech in Vilnius. “After all this time Putin still doubts our staying power. He is making a bad bet.”

To that end, NATO allies have made dramatic increases in current defense spending as well as future pledges that the U.S. has long complained were inadequate. Germany’s commitments alone after years of spurning the 2 percent GDP spending requirement of member states shows that Berlin’s reluctance to make the necessary financial commitments has changed tremendously. Allies also agreed to station more troops in frontline states, create a massive reserve force for rapid deployment, and reaffirmed NATO’s nuclear posture. All these efforts further illustrate the remarkable unity of the moment.

But Russia was not the only focus. NATO allies called on Iran to halt its nuclear efforts and acted to rebut the growing threat of China as a united front. While NATO members did not describe Beijing as an adversary, they invited Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea to attend as observers. Japan also became an “official partner” by signing a new agreement that addressed the “coercive” efforts of China on the international stage while also noting its human rights abuses at home.

In all, the meeting continued to underscore the unity of the alliance, which was sorely tested by the Trump administration and the withdrawal from Afghanistan. But it also highlighted that the world should be prepared for a long-term international security situation that could challenge our current thinking about the global order. The decades of relative peace in Europe that followed the end of World War II and the Cold War are being re-evaluated. There appears to be some hope, however, that the investments the alliance makes today may prevent “fighting a war tomorrow.”

Prigozhin’s Mutiny

Within 72 hours the world watched as Russians turned to fight Russians and Ukraine gained ground as a result. In Ukraine, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s angry screeds on Telegram aimed at the highest levels of Moscow’s defense establishment created opportunity and schadenfreude. In Russia, many welcomed his anger as President Vladimir Putin’s “special military operation” entered its 17th month. Russia has suffered hundreds of thousands of casualties, and it is difficult to see an end in sight, even in insulated Moscow. Some feared it could mean the end of the regime and the country.

The days that followed were as confusing as they were fascinating.

The short-lived mutiny was the culmination of an ongoing controversy between Prigozhin and the Russian military leadership. His ire was focused primarily on Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the Russian General Staff Valery Gerasimov, who was also the commander of all military operations in Ukraine. Prigozhin had frequently released profanity laced videos, audio and social media posts denouncing Shoigu and Gerasimov as incompetent. He directly blamed them for the deaths of thousands of Wagner soldiers who he argued were not supplied sufficient ammunition while bearing the bulk of the fighting in places like Bakhmut. But he never directly criticized Russian President Vladimir Putin. As a result, Putin largely ignored Prigozhin’s criticisms and allowed him to continue to operate with great freedom in support of Russian efforts in the Ukraine war as well as assisting Moscow’s interests in Africa, the Middle East, and other locations around the globe. Prigozhin had been rewarded with contracts over the past year worth about $1 billion.

A few weeks ago, Prigozhin was informed by the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) that his Wagner mercenaries would be placed under their direct control. He refused to comply even after this directive was publicly endorsed by Putin, setting the stage for a final confrontation. At the start of his revolt, Prigozhin claimed the Russian MOD had directed rocket attacks against Wagner bases killing hundreds of his soldiers when he did not immediately comply.

Prigozhin and his Wagner mercenaries turned their backs on the ongoing conflict and formally confronted the Russian military leadership. The mercenary chief seized the capital of Russia’s southern military district, shot down Russian aircraft, and advanced on Moscow with thousands of troops in a “march for justice” that was aimed at the removal of Shoigu and Gerasimov.

But then it all ended with an abruptness that confused the world.

Prigozhin and his Wagner troops halted 120 miles from Moscow and “Putin’s Chef” suddenly announced that he would end a revolt that had White House officials concerned a major nuclear state might be on the verge of collapse. At the end, Putin publicly called his former confidante a traitor and said Prigozhin had stabbed the nation in the back. Putin promised that the organizers behind the revolt would be held responsible.

“The organizers of this rebellion not only betrayed their country and their people, but also betrayed those whom they dragged into this mutiny,” the Russian leader said in a defiant public address a day after Prigozhin’s march ended.

But even as he appeared angry, he offered Prigozhin and his troops an out. Putin announced an agreement had been brokered by Belarus President Aleksandr Lukashenko. It allowed Prigozhin to live in exile in Belarus and further pardoned Wagner mercenaries who had participated in the ill-fated coup and even killed Russian soldiers. They were given the options of joining the Russian Army, moving with Prigozhin to Belarus, or going home.

That ended the charade for Russia publicly, but where does this leave NATO countries, Russia, Ukraine, the war, Prigozhin and Putin? This geopolitical question could define the future of the Ukraine war and shape the future world order. Unfortunately, the answer is very unclear at this moment.

What Prigozhin does next, if he even survives the next few weeks and months, is unknown. Lukashenko offered him and his forces an abandoned military base as part of the agreement he negotiated. Still, those who have been an inconvenience to the Kremlin or done far less to challenge Putin’s power have found themselves dead with little explanation. Many of their families have also died in the process.

Beyond that, the Baltic States and Poland are concerned that Prigozhin and several thousand of his Wagner troops will now be based near their borders. Ukrainian officials also fear their presence could threaten the country’s northern flank. Whether Prigozhin or these forces intend to pursue future military efforts for Russia or other clients is unknown, but this issue will be discussed at the upcoming NATO Summit.

Putin now appears to be attempting to discredit Prigozhin and seize control of his paramilitary forces and media empire. Russian officials have been dispatched to the Central African Republic, Syria, and other countries where Wagner mercenaries are operating to assume command of these forces. The apparent goal: Integrate Wagner troops into the Russian military or make it a state-owned enterprise. These efforts are designed to end Prigozhin’s influence and cash flow.

Russian General Sergey Surovikin, who previously led the Russian military in Ukraine and carries the nickname “General Armageddon” for his brutal tactics in Syria, was friendly with Prigozhin. He has not been seen since he released a video imploring the mercenary chief to end his mutiny. U.S. officials reportedly believe he has been arrested by Russian security services for supporting the short-lived insurrection. Surovikin may become the scapegoat for the Russian military’s failure to respond to Prigozhin’s advance on Moscow.

Putin has further announced investigations will be conducted about corruption surrounding the many contracts the Russian government had signed with Prigozhin. The mercenary leader is viewed as a patriot and even a war hero by many Russians. Putin does not need a martyr.

But where does this bizarre mess leave Russia’s leader, his government, and his war?

Putin is undoubtedly weaker today than he was prior to the revolt, and the Russian military will have a difficult time recovering. In the aftermath of Surovikin’s detention there will likely be a major shakeup of the Russian military leadership and forces. Putin may also conduct a purge of the Russian officer corps to ensure their allegiance.

Ukraine’s military appears to have seized on the ongoing turmoil and claims to now have the strategic initiative. They are conducting a multipronged attack near Bakhmut, the city that was the center of recent fighting and that the Wagner mercenary group ironically helped capture earlier this year. Many Western commentators have argued that this moment is an opportunity for Ukraine.

Russian forces prior to the coup attempt were suffering from poor morale, and reports of these events will eventually make its way to front line troops and only make that worse. It appears the Russian MOD needs Wagner soldiers but how these troops or their officers could be relied upon would appear questionable. Trust is fundamental to successful military operations and that has been undermined.

The Ukrainians have also noted that Wagner forces were able to seize Rostov-on-Don, the nerve center of Russian military operations in Ukraine for command and control, logistics and supplies. The mercenaries met little resistance, which shows that there could be some weakness in this area.

Russian defense leadership appears somewhat safe for now. Defense Minister Shoigu was pictured with Putin, who thanked and praised Russian security forces, soon after Prigozhin halted his march.

Gerasimov, chief of the general staff, has not been seen since the revolt began, however. It has been reported that Gen. Mikhail Tepinsky, an airborne commander, will assume command of ongoing combat operations in Ukraine, relieving Gerasimov of those responsibilities. While Putin appears to have sided with the senior military establishment, they will be under pressure to produce quick results in Ukraine that will buoy the Russian president’s image at home and abroad. The whole debacle also makes it impossible for Putin to order a new mobilization or expanded conscription.

Putin is undoubtedly weakened, and his case for the invasion was also publicly undermined at the onset of the uprising. Prigozhin began his attempted coup by calling Russia’s stated reasons for the war “lies” promulgated by military and government leaders. He said Ukraine, NATO, and the West had not threatened Russia. In In a Telegram post Prigozhin argued, “The war was not needed to return our Russian citizens and not to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine.”

“The war was needed by oligarchs. It was needed by the clan that is today practically ruling in Russia,” he added, suggesting to the Russian people that the over 200,000 casualties were unnecessary.

But Putin cannot be counted out. He will most certainly attempt to regain his authority. This could make him more dangerous to those who are willing to voice dissent at home. It also could be a major danger for Ukraine and the West.

Russia remains a major nuclear power, and Putin has recently moved tactical nuclear weapons to Belarus, which again raised fears he might escalate and use a weapon of mass destruction. Numerous former military and diplomatic officials voiced concerns that Putin might seek to overcome this moment of weakness by using a tactical nuclear weapon to stymie Ukraine’s counteroffensive. This would also be consistent with Russian nuclear doctrine of escalating to de-escalate and, in so doing, he would project his strongman image.

There are also suggestions that Russian forces are withdrawing from the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) and may be preparing to orchestrate a nuclear “accident” that Moscow would then attempt to blame on Kyiv. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly warned of this possibility as part of a Russian strategy to freeze the war.

Bolshevik leader Vladmir Lenin once said, "There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen." This could be prophetic for recent events. Putin knows better than anyone that there are no retirement homes for old dictators. His personal survival depends on his ability to stay in power. This will be determined by success or failure on the battlefield and his ability to reassert his position as a strongman at home. Whether it’s Covid or coups, it appears he is committed to keeping his hold no matter what.

Washington and Beijing – looking for a relationship

In 1972, Richard Nixon famously stood atop the Great Wall amid a whirlwind tour through three of China’s major cities. His visit stabilized relations between China and the U.S. for the first time since the Communist Party seized power in 1949. The visit, which symbolized a rapprochement between the United States and China, significantly shifted the international order and arguably ended the Cold War in East Asia. It was not just an illustration of that shift, however. The meetings were substantive — “a week that changed the world,” some said — and led to the Shanghai Communique, and its ambiguity regarding the status of Taiwan that continues to influence American policy.

More than 50 years later, the Biden administration is looking for that kind of success as it sends senior officials and cabinet members to meet their Chinese counterparts in recent months. Despite efforts by the White House to cool tensions between the two countries, relations are at their lowest point since Nixon’s visit. Clearly, U.S.-Chinese relations are at a crossroads, and President Biden wants to find a plateau in the relationship, dampen tensions, and avoid a crisis — while still appearing tough to the electorate.

Biden’s desire to improve relations is hardly altruistic statecraft or misguided idealism. It is the most important effort the two countries can undertake. They are two of the globe’s greatest military superpowers and the two largest economies. Both are unable to ignore that reality, and this relationship will shape the international system throughout the 21st century.

But can China and the United States find that bottom line and halt this continuing downward spiral? Is it possible to avoid the “Thucydides trap” that argues conflict is inevitable between rising powers and established ones? As of now, those answers are unclear, and recent developments in China under President Xi Jinping make the situation murkier — though some might speculate about a few promising signs.

BIDEN’S DE-RISKING VS. CONGRESS’S DECOUPLING

Many in Congress have argued for a strategy that would seek to “decouple” the U.S. from China. The idea is to put the U.S. in a position where it is not economically or financially reliant on China. The PRC has repeatedly abused the U.S. by stealing intellectual property, spying on American industries, and disrupting existing supply chain which were exacerbated by Xi’s Covid lockdowns.

But this is a tall order, considering how interwoven American and Chinese economic interests have become, and it may not be achievable. American trade with China amounts to over $700 billion annually. The PRC is also the largest holder of American treasury bills and is in many ways the United States largest “banker.”

That is why the Biden administration has begun to speak about “de-risking” the U.S.- China relationship instead. He aims to limit Beijing’s access to advanced technologies and foreign investments in China that are deemed to pose security risks. This must be accomplished while maintaining American overall economic and financial interests.

China has similar motivations to improve relations, but it is frustrated by limitations imposed by what the PRC perceives as an “aging superpower.” Diplomatic efforts by Washington to revise Asian security architecture, which Beijing believes is a strategy of encirclement, is viewed as a direct challenge to Chinese security interests. Still both sides recognize that, unlike the great power dispute of the Cold War, they are mutually dependent. That inextricable link did not exist between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, which chose a command economy at the cost of greater access to global markets — a path the Chinese Communist Party has avoided since the 1990s.

Beijing is also not helping to reduce tensions, as it continues actions that are contrary to American national security interests. Chinese leaders (to include President Xi) continue to argue that reunification with Taiwan is a core national interest, and the February spy balloon incident led to the cancellation of a scheduled trip to China by Secretary of State Blinken. The Chinese military air force buzzed an American reconnaissance plane, and one of its ships cut in front of U.S. destroyers transiting the Taiwan Straits. Beijing has also sought to hack American officials email accounts, invested in intelligence gathering facilities in Cuba, and two Navy servicemembers were recently arrested for spying for the PRC.

These actions have resulted in rising rancor in the Congress and bipartisan support for taking aggressive actions against China. There have been further calls for expanded military assistance to Taiwan and increasing overall U.S. defense spending. Members of the U.S. military have also been outspoken about preparing for a potential conflict with China, and policymaker continue efforts in the AsiaPacific region to expand American defense relationships with South Korea, Japan, Philippines, Australia, and India.

BIDEN’S CHINA DIPLOMACY

Despite these challenges, the Biden administration has redoubled its efforts, as it has become increasingly clear that “decoupling” from China could be devastating to the American economy.

Secretary Blinken’s trip to Beijing was rescheduled, which was the first high-level engagement between the two countries since Biden met Xi in November 2022. It was the first visit to China by an American Secretary of State since 2018.

Blinken’s goal was to open communications, discuss “important challenges, address misperceptions, and prevent miscalculation.” The secretary of state underscored U.S. concerns and sought areas of cooperation on transnational issues. But ultimately Blinken was testing the waters to see if there was a path to reduce tensions and set the stage for a meeting between Biden and Xi at the AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation Summit scheduled for the fall.

During his visit, Blinken met with Chinese foreign minister for over four hours and had a 35-minute meeting with Xi. Senior Republicans criticized this, but it is interesting to note that both Bill Gates and Elon Musk had preceded Blinken to Beijing, and Gates met with Xi as well. In addition, recent trips by Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger indicate a Chinese desire to influence or discuss U.S. policy interests with those they deem “pragmatists.”

While Blinken’s visit appears to have gone well overall, the Chinese refused to reinitiate military to military talks designed to avoid accidents or incidents. While the rationale for China’s refusal is unclear, some experts believe they may be waiting to see if they can extract even greater political concessions from Washington prior to recommencing such discussions. Others have suggested that Xi may not have absolute faith in his own military and wants to consolidate major decisions within the Party and its current leadership.

At the same time, China continues to walk a tightrope with respect to its policies towards the Ukraine war. At times Beijing appears to be underscoring its close relationship with Russia and Vladimir Putin. For example, the Chinese military recently conducted naval exercises with the Russian Navy in the Sea of Japan and near U.S. waters in Alaska which created an uproar in Washington. At the same time, China dispatched representatives to the recent peace conference hosted by Saudi Arabia and sought to signal Beijing’s desire for a peaceful end to the conflict. The Chinese representative also met with National Security Adviser Sullivan on the margins of this event.

This also comes amid several mysterious changes in key Chinese leadership positions. Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang suddenly disappeared in late June. He had orchestrated the combative approach known as “wolf warrior diplomacy” that had worsened tensions between the two countries . Qin was a close Xi ally and had been swiftly promoted by the president, but there has been little explanation for his sudden departure. He was replaced by Wang Yi. Wang previously held the position of foreign minister but had been made director of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee for Foreign Affairs. Secretary Blinken has now extended an invitation for Qin to visit the U.S. this fall.

In addition, President Xi announced sudden changes in the leadership of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, who oversee the ongoing expansion of the PRC’s strategic nuclear forces. The commander and senior political commissar were both fired over allegations of graft and corruption. A deputy commander has also disappeared, and there have been reports he committed suicide. Clearly this internal discord could stymie the Chinese president’s efforts to improve relations and may indicate even greater domestic troubles in future.

CHINA’S DOMESTIC REALITY

Xi clearly has an interest in ensuring that the economic, military, and political power remains centralized under him and the Chinese Communist Party. After all, he is a true believer: he clearly embraces Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which means he believes the collapse of the U.S. is inevitable. He also underwent a ”coronation” at the 20th Party Congress in October 2022, which recognized him as leader of China for life and as the most powerful PRC leader since Mao Zedong.

But Xi faces major challenges at home, and domestic issues have troubled him for years. An adviser to President Barack Obama once observed that when the former president met with Xi, Obama would speak about global issues and Xi would talk about Chinese domestic problems. These issues have only grown for the Chinese leader since Obama left the White House

The Chinese economy has not recovered as quickly from the ravages of Covid that many economists had expected, and it has led to one of the first major financial blips for the country since it began an economic transformation in the 1990s. In July exports fell by 14.5% and imports by 12.4% — far worse than predicted and prices are falling raising fears of deflation. It is also experiencing a significant drop in home and commercial property values, and a reduction in consumer spending. These challenges are coupled with high unemployment for the younger generation, above 20% for those between 16 and 25, and underemployment for recent college graduates. All of this is occurring at the same time the nation’s population ages and shrinks.

In response, the government announced a series of policies to stimulate economic growth with mixed results and skepticism in the business community. Xi has also dispatched Chinese representatives to Europe to shore up trade relations with the EU, which is increasingly a critical market for Chinese exports. He has promised that China will soon return to rapid growth — as high as 5% GDP annually. But a fundamental question is looming – are China’s growing economic difficulties episodic or systemic based on changes in Chinese society and demography?

Still the security apparatus is pervasive and fully controlled by the party. As a result, there is little clear opposition remaining in China. Consequently, Xi may have time to deal with these internal challenges before domestic pressures bubble to the surface and force a change in his approach towards the West.

He may also hope that new political leadership in the White House or Congress after the 2024 election could focus America’s attention on domestic issues and lead to compromise on Taiwan and other security issues due to the close economic ties between the two countries.

Biden knows the deep suspicions both sides have about each other cannot be erased. He is also restrained by rising animosity towards China in the Congress and the impending start to the Presidential campaign in 2024. Issues such as Taiwan, American criticism of Beijing’s record on human rights, tariffs, access to advanced technology, the war in Ukraine, etc. will not disappear. Consequently, the possibility of a major compromise by either side is hard to envision in the short term.

Whatever the outcome, we must be clear-eyed that the relationship between the PRC and the United States remains critical for global peace and stability. How Washington and Beijing manage inevitable strategic competition while avoiding conflict is vital to both countries and global economic development. Mistrust will continue but resuming dialogue and diplomacy is far better than someday watching events uncontrollably escalate to war. This may be the most essential leadership task facing Mr. Biden and his successors.

Modi is coming to town!

India and its Prime Minister Narendra Modi have kept their options open as the global order has been upended in recent years by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and China’s aggressive expansionist policies. That sense of impartiality is something President Joe Biden is hoping to change, however, when Modi arrives in Washington, D.C. for an official state visit, only a few months before India is set to host the G20 Meeting. This is only the third state visit by an Indian leader to the U.S. in 75 years.

The Biden administration is seeking to expand economic, diplomatic, and potentially security ties with India as a future bulwark against the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic of China. The aim is also to undermine the economic support India provides to Russia by purchasing weapons and oil from Moscow. But India has successfully remained above the “fray” and avoided aligning its policies closely with any other nation, despite maintaining its ties with the U.S., China, and Russia.

Under Modi’s religious and conservative leadership, India is undergoing a nationalistic transformation with a young population and a booming economy. Its median age is one of the youngest at around 28 and, after three decades of steady growth, India’s economy ranks as the fastest growing among the G20 nations. It is emerging as a significant world power that has immense influence particularly over the global south and developing countries. In this strong position, India has been able to pursue its own priorities that frequently differ from the West’s, China’s, or Russia’s.

The Biden administration, like its predecessors, recognizes India’s voice is only growing stronger and seeks its support and cooperation. Prime Minister Modi knows this. With that in mind, what might we expect from the Indian leader’s visit to the White House? Could Washington secure closer relations with New Delhi on issues of economics, diplomacy as well as national security or at least convince Modi that his nation should more forcefully respond to the aggressive policies of both Beijing and Moscow?

India’s Historical and Present Conflicts

Since India achieved independence in 1947, the country has followed a policy of nonalignment throughout the Cold War, and this has continued in response to recent East-West tension. Worldwide it is considered a leader of the so-called “non-alignment movement,” as many smaller or poorer countries have long sought to avoid being involved in superpower rivalries that they do not believe address the needs of their populations. India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru famously said more than a half century ago, “We are not pro-Russian, nor for that matter are we pro-American. We are pro-Indian.” This was the founding foreign policy principle that has guided India and now many other nations.

India may have been non-aligned during the Cold War, but it maintained cordial relations with the Soviet Union. New Delhi purchased massive amounts of Soviet military hardware and continued this military dependency once the Soviet Union collapsed. Today, approximately 60-70% of the equipment in the Indian Army and Air Force was purchased from Moscow.

New Delhi still has its own national security concerns, some that have persisted since the former British colony first became a nation. Tensions between India and Pakistan have existed since the two nations were partitioned along religious and political lines in 1947. This has resulted in one of the most militarized borders in the world, three wars and many skirmishes between these two countries. Even today New Delhi keeps roughly 100,000 troops deployed in the vicinity of Kashmir. American efforts to also have good relations with Pakistan during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 as well as America’s own war there complicated efforts to improve cooperation with New Delhi., This only got worse after the attack by ten Pakistani terrorists in November 2012. This attack resulted in the death of 164 civilians and is viewed by the Indian population as their “9-11.”

India has also fought a war with China, as the 1962 Sino-Indian War occurred along their shared border in the Himalayas. There was a brief subsequent border clash in 1967, and Indian leaders have continued to argue that the Chinese occupy territory that belongs to India. Tensions rose once again between Beijing and Delhi in recent years and brief skirmishes have occurred between Indian and Chinese forces. The most recent occurring in December 2022. As a result, India has also deployed roughly 100,000 troops in this region and made a significant effort to improve the road network and airfields to support military operations in the Himalayas. Chinese naval expansion in the Indian Ocean has also become a major concern for the Modi government.

India now has the second largest military on the planet and is also a significant nuclear power. New Delhi conducted a nuclear test in 1974 and subsequently built a nuclear arsenal that today is believed to consist of roughly 160 nuclear warheads. Indian leaders had strongly objected to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (signed in 1968) as a discriminatory measure against non-nuclear states. Pakistan followed suit with nuclear tests in May of 1998 which occurred only a few weeks after India’s second round of nuclear tests. Islamabad’s arsenal is now slightly larger than India’s, and Pakistani leaders have also begun the development of so-called “tactical nuclear weapons.” The expanding nuclear arsenals of these two nations coupled with their historical animosity as well as growing terrorism in the region has continued to endanger international peace and security.

Obstacles and Opportunities

In October 2008, the U.S. lifted a three-decade U.S. moratorium on nuclear trade with India — a major breakthrough in relations between the two countries. Critics argued that it reversed 50 years of U.S. nonproliferation efforts and undermined attempts to prevent states like Iran or North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. But by further providing U.S. assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program and expanding U.S.-India cooperation in energy and satellite technology, it also cemented a new and more cordial relationship between New Delhi and Washington.

Another significant development for the relationship came through the formation of the Quad, orchestrated by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2007 as a strategic security dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It included diplomatic dialogue and joint military exercises which were viewed as a response to increased Chinese economic and military power. Though the Quad briefly ceased , it was resurrected at the 2017 ASEAN Summit to counter China militarily and diplomatically in the Indo-Pacific region. It is also important to note that India remains the only Quad member with a border with China.

Rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific region have created conditions where relations between Washington and New Delhi could improve both rapidly and significantly. This is particularly true given the recent Chinese “balloon” controversy as well as recent aggressive military actions by the PRC and India’s position as a burgeoning economic and military superpower.

But obstacles as well as opportunities persist. The wave of Hindu nationalism that Modi and his party rode to power cannot be ignored. His government has clearly sought to restrict the rights of Muslims, and supporters fomented recent widespread ethnic violence in Manipur. His primary political opponent, Rahul Gandhi, was also convicted of defamation for a remark he made about Modi during the 2019 election. He now faces a two-year prison term and loss of his seat in parliament, and this comes just as the nation prepares for national elections in 2024. Many fear that Indian “democracy” is now at risk.

Still, Modi currently enjoys 70% popularity with the population based on recent polls and may be the world’s most popular democratically elected leader. He is clearly a populist, and his policies are not dissimilar from those pursued by Prime Minister Victor Orbán in Hungary or President Erdogan of Turkey. As chair for the G20, India was critical of the war in Ukraine at a recent meeting it hosted of the world’s largest economies. Prime Minister Modi argued the war placed global sustainable development at risk. Consequently, his government has continued its traditional foreign policy goal of remaining “nonaligned” while benefiting from the purchase of Russian energy at discounted prices. Russian oil now accounts for nearly 20% of India's annual crude imports, up from just 2% in 2021.

Outcomes?

It does not seem, however, that the Biden administration should have lofty expectations about the outcome of Modi’s impending trip. State visits are largely staged events with significant pageantry and pre-planned “deliverables” It was not a coincidence that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin visited India earlier this month as did National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan.

U.S.-India economic relations have improved significantly in recent years. Bilateral trade increased to $191 billion in 2022, and the United States is now India’s top trading partner. Observers should expect announcements concerning expanded trade, improved supply chains, semiconductor chips, and perhaps an agreement for the joint production of GE F-414 jet engines to power indigenous Indian fighter aircraft or the co-production of long-range artillery. There also appears to be plans to announce an initiative on critical and emerging technology that could portend dramatic cooperation between Indian and American defense industries in future.

But Washington should not expect a dramatic shift in Indian national security policy.

Modi’s policies are popular at home and his third-way strategy has the support of many underdeveloped countries globally. He is unlikely to change his public stance on the Ukraine War and will likely reiterate his support for peace (though it is doubtful he has a plan for it). At most, the U.S. and India will have discussions about tensions in the Taiwan Straits, but policy will not change. At this point, Biden would be delighted with a bland joint statement that “peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits and South China Sea is in the national interests of both countries.”

There is an old saying “culture eats strategy for lunch daily,” and this might clarify Indian policy perspectives. Modi remains a Hindu nationalist who desires that his country have “partners” around the world. He has yet to see reason for close allies.

Biden's Asian Strategy

As of now, President Joe Biden is scheduled to make a major trip to Asia beginning on 19 May to attend the G7 Summit in Hiroshima, Japan, and a subsequent meeting in Australia with the so-called “Quad” countries. The journey comes amid rising tensions with China. The brinksmanship between the two global heavyweights is nearing historic levels and numerous nations have noted the increasingly heated rhetoric. Washington has good reason to be concerned. China challenges the U.S. in terms of its economy, technology, and military.

China will be a central topic during Biden’s trip. The president will meet with the leaders of the U.K., Germany, France, Canada, Italy, and Japan in Hiroshima for the G7 summit meeting. Eight other countries from the Global South were also invited to attend. Biden will then travel to Australia for a meeting of the “Quad” – the US, Australia, Japan, and India. What is the background for these meetings and potential outcomes for US national security strategy? What can we expect to occur?

President Donald Trump is credited with changing Americans’ relations with China as something more than mere competition, but the Biden administration has taken numerous steps to create a new security architecture throughout the Pacific to confront the rising threat posed by Beijing. These two meetings will further cement a foreign policy structure that buttresses U.S. national security concerns. They will likely expand and renew alliances and relationships between countries that could potentially encircle and deter China’s expansionist policies that have grown rapidly in recent years. The Biden administration’s focus since the beginning of 2023 has been on diplomacy and consensus building in Asia. This has led to new relationships and the expansion of established alliances that address China, the war in Ukraine and other emerging challenges.

The Biden Effort

In January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida visited the White House. The two leaders underscored the importance of US-Japanese relations and the American commitment to Tokyo. This was followed by an announcement that the Japanese government would seek to raise defense spending to 2% of Japanese gross domestic product (GDP). If Tokyo reaches this goal it would translate into an annual defense budget of roughly $140 billion, which would make Japan the third largest spender on defense on the planet. That is behind only the U.S. and China.

Then in March, Mr. Biden travelled to San Diego to host the Prime Ministers of Australia and the United Kingdom. Together they underscored their combined support for the so-called AUKUS agreement. This pact means that the U.K. and U.S. will assist Australia in the production of nuclear-powered attack submarines. It will further allow American and British submarines to use port facilities in Australia in future, which will allow them to have longer station time for Pacific Ocean patrols. The agreement infuriated Beijing.

In April and May, Biden hosted President Yoon Suk Yeol, the leader of South Korea, and President Ferdinand Marcos, the leader of the Philippines. During Yoon’s visit, the two presidents continued to emphasize the importance of U.S.-Korean bilateral relations. Yoon abandoned his earlier statement that the Seoul would consider producing its own nuclear weapons if the U.S. did not again deploy nuclear weapons to the Korean peninsula. Out of this, the so-called “Washington Declaration” was born, whereby the U.S. agreed to periodically bring American nuclear powered submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles to Korean ports to enhance deterrence with respect to North Korea. The Biden administration further agreed to establish a new joint American-Korean body to discuss nuclear policy with respect to the Korean peninsula.

During the May meeting with President Marcos, it was announced that the United States and the Philippines would conduct the largest joint military exercise in their history. In addition, Manila agreed to allow American forces use of four bases in the Philippines — a huge strategic win for the U.S. over China. These bases are all in the northern portion of the country and provide American forces greater access to the South China Sea. It also means U.S. military forces will be stationed only a few hundred miles from the southern coast of Taiwan.

The Dynamics of the G7 and the Quad

There will be 15 ministerial meetings across Japan for this year’s G7. Some have already met and the last meeting, which is about trade, will be held until October. But the most important is the summit. It will occur May 19 to 21 and will take place in Hiroshima, the hometown of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida — a poignant setting as nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is one of the center pieces of discussion, according to the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

The two other top issues are economic resilience and economic security. Leaders will work on building resilient supply chains, non-market policies and practices as well as economic coercion. Exact terms on how to respond to Beijing economically are unclear, however. French President Emmanuel Macron raised eyebrows recently when he proposed pushing for European autonomy from the U.S. during his meetings with China President Xi Jinping. There is good reason the Europeans may have concerns. Unlike Russia, isolating China from the world economy could be truly damaging, particularly for European countries.

Still, regional security affairs will be part of the G7 discussions. Russia’s aggression will again be denounced as a challenge to the rule-based international order, and the countries’ leaders will discuss further sanctions against Moscow. They will also make public their plan to “reaffirm and strengthen cooperation on the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific,’ which is expected to repudiate China’s growing regional influence, threats to Taiwan, and efforts to gain control of the South China Sea.

To strengthen the reach of that dialogue, Japan has purposefully emphasized the group’s outreach to the Global South, where Russia and China have made huge gains in support and influence. They have also invited Australia, Brazil, Comoros (African Union Chair), the Cook Islands (Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Chair), India (G20 Presidency), Indonesia (ASEAN Chair), the Republic of Korea, and Vietnam. Japan’s invitation to Australia and South Korea is notable. Both countries have long harbored ill will toward Tokyo, but Japan has openly acknowledged that the Biden administration has worked to diminish historic resentments between these nations due to the need for greater cooperation.

Japan, based on Prime Minister Kishida’s announcement earlier this year, is rapidly becoming a regional military as well as a global economic power. Tokyo is also seeking improved relations with South Korea in response to growing Chinese military and economic power. While neither country considers Beijing as large a threat as Washington does — diplomats from both countries make jokes about the spy balloon saga behind closed doors — they do see China actively pushing the limits of historic norms and international law. Seoul and Tokyo noted that Beijing has “crossed the line” repeatedly by entering their waters or pursuing government, corporate and technological espionage.

Conversations with India, Indonesia, Vietnam, Brazil, and Australia will also be key in cementing Biden’s strategy. If all parties can come to some form of agreement, China will face a form of encirclement that could fundamentally change the stakes in Asia.

The Quad will meet shortly thereafter, and that will further this effort. While once an informal group meeting of Australia, the U.S., Japan, and India; the gathering has grown more serious as talks focused on security and other issues in the IndoPacific region. The Leaders’ Summit will take place at the iconic Sydney Opera House.

Beijing itself views the meeting warily and sees it as a direct threat to its regional if not global influence as well as an effort to contain China’s interests. Like the G7, the focus will be on security and economic issues. Nuclear challenges are expected to take a backseat.

Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has said in advance of the meeting that together the member countries will be “leveraging our collective strengths” to “shape the Indo-Pacific region we all want to live in.” Further, the partners are expected to take actions to tighten economic ties through efforts that are aimed to improve regional health security, advance certain critical technologies, strengthen connectivity, enhance clean energy, and boost supply chain resilience.

Overall, this meeting will function as another way to aggressively buttress cooperation against China.

At the same time, the Biden administration is seeking to find a “plateau” at least in Sino-US relations as the administration has pursued meetings with Chinese officials in recent days. National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan met with China’s top diplomat, Wang Yi in Vienna on May 11. The Chinese embassy announced that the purpose of these meetings was “removing obstacles in China-U.S. relations and stabilizing the relationship from deterioration.”

The “Biden Asian Strategy” is clearly aimed at expanding existing security relationships and creating new ones. At the same time the administration is seeking to create a coordinated global economic strategy with allies. It appears clear, however, that the White House has acknowledged a clear economic reality — decoupling from the Chinese economy is not possible and unlikely to gain allied support. Richard Haas, a well-known Asian expert has observed that “the Chinese believe they have a high degree of flexibility to use aggressive tactics to protect its interests because the European countries in particular cannot afford to allow for a rupture.” That theory may be put to the test in the days ahead. While the foundations of a strong security architecture have been put in place, how the Biden administration proceeds in this highwire act remains to be seen as it aims to secure American interests and level the partisan rancor pushing for further Chinese brinksmanship.

Saudi Arabia and Iran Reestablish Diplomatic Relations

Some would find it welcome news that Saudi Arabia and Iran are planning to normalize diplomatic relations after seven years of estrangement following talks mediated by the Chinese. Tensions have always been high between these two regional powers in the Middle East. To hear that Saudi Arabia and Iran decided to turn down the temperature — even after Saudi Crown Prince Muhammed bin Salman declared Iran’s supreme leader made “Hitler look good” — would appear to provide a measure of stability to a region that has been fraught with uncertainty and confrontations.

But it complicates the United States’ position in the Middle East, as it underscores the growing influence of Beijing in this vital region. While the Saudis are said to have kept the U.S. apprised of the situation, Washington played no direct role in the negotiations despite a yearslong effort to broker a peace agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. U.S. officials have attempted to diminish the significance of the rapprochement negotiated by rival-turned-foe China. But the Chinese agreement goes beyond diplomatic relations and includes the revival of a security pact. Both sides further pledge not to attack each other (even through proxies), tone down their hostile media rhetoric and refrain from meddling in each other’s domestic affairs. But what are the broader geopolitical impacts? Who may gain and who may lose if in fact this is fully effected?

What Does the Agreement Deliver for Saudi Arabia and Iran?

Iran’s pledge to cease attacks against Saudi Arabia includes those initiated by Houthi rebels in Yemen that are backed by Tehran. The devastating cruise missile and drone attack against the Abqaiq oil facility in September of 2019 that was widely believed to have been engineered by Iran nearly brought the two nations to war.

This agreement could pave the way for a resolution of the war in Yemen that has been ongoing for almost a decade and resulted in one of the greatest ongoing humanitarian disasters on the planet. Iran and Saudi Arabia have backed opposing sides in the conflict. The Houthi rebels who are Shiite and backed by Iran have launched numerous missile attacks against Saudi Arabia. In response, the kingdom has suffered international condemnation for its unrelenting air campaign in support of the Yemeni government which has failed to result in victory. A truce has existed for nearly one year, and it is now hoped this will be extended. Many experts believe Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) has sought a “graceful way” to bring this war to a conclusion.

The Crown Prince likely believes a reduction in tensions with his largest neighbor will serve to reduce his political isolation and encourage foreign investments in the kingdom, which is clearly a priority. His “Vision 2030” plan remains his primary focus and is designed to make Saudi Arabia a global hub for business and culture over the next decade. The Saudi government is bidding to host the World Expo in 2030, and this could not be realized if the war with Yemen continued and Houthi missiles were flying through the air.

While the agreement hints that Saudi Arabia is forging new ties with U.S. foes Iran and China, numerous experts have observed that the Saudis still “think about security in English.” MBS likely will continue to look to Washington for protection, American weapons as well as security guarantees, but will use this recent aloofness as leverage against Washington.

Tehran is thinking similarly. The government has faced ongoing massive social protests since last fall and the apparent collapse of the 2015 nuclear agreement known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which reduced the threat of continued crushing Western economic sanctions . The Iranian economy remains in dire condition with rampant inflation and high unemployment particularly among the young.

Iran, it appears, is hoping to normalize relations with other actors in the region, including Bahrain and Egypt — it already resumed relations with the United Arab Emirates last year. But it also faces international criticism for providing weapons to Russia to aid its invasion of Ukraine, its ongoing efforts to enrich uranium to develop nuclear weapons, domestic repression, and for escalating tensions with Israel. On the global stage, all these items serve as an indictment of the Iranian regime.

The agreement could help Tehran break from international isolation while undermining the Americans’ position that Iran is a threat to global peace and security. Furthermore, the agreement does nothing to inhibit its ongoing development of conventional or nuclear weapons, despite Saudi concerns about Iran’s nuclear program.

As the JCPOA appears effectively dead, this agreement could encourage some aspect of Iranian temperance. The U.S. is the only country to withdraw from the nuclear deal, but it is important to acknowledge that Beijing is also a signatory along with Russia, Britain, France, and Germany. Despite apparent good relations between Beijing and Tehran, the Chinese are not interested in Iran becoming a nuclear power, and this agreement could push the Iranians to pump the brakes on their nuclear enrichment program.

Is the U.S. the Loser?

China enjoyed its status of peacemaker in the aftermath of the negotiations with its top diplomat Wang Yi calling the agreement “a victory for dialogue.” Beijing even received accolades from U.N. Secretary General António Guterres and others. In the immediate aftermath of the announcement, the White House claimed the agreement mirrored their blueprint that they’d initiated in 2021. U.S. Central Command Chief Gen. Michael Kurilla also attempted to pour cold water on Beijing’s efforts while testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee. “An agreement is not implementation,” he said.

But it is a concrete deliverable for the moment, which is more than the U.S. can boast about its recent dealings with Iran and/or Saudi Arabia. Many in Washington also admit that an end to the war in Yemen and a general lessening of tensions in the Middle East is a positive development. The UN estimated at the end of 2021 that over 377,000 people have died during the Yemeni war from violence, starvation, or disease.

An undercurrent of all this, however, is that relations between Riyadh and Washington have become strained over what the Saudis perceive to be a diminishment of the American security guarantee, the Biden administration’s criticism of the kingdom for the murder of Jamal Khashoggi and its human rights record. The Biden administration was also clearly angered by MBS’s decision in November to cut oil production in an effort with Russia to keep crude oil prices high. The president believed that his “fist bump” visit with the Crown Prince during the summer of 2022 (which cost him a great deal of political capital) had cemented an agreement to maintain or increase oil production levels, which would have helped reduce inflationary pressures. The strain between Riyadh and Washington was underscored again with a recent announcement that OPEC (led by Saudi Arabia) would reduce daily production by nearly 1.7 million barrels.

Israel also has a reason to be considered the “loser” in the aftermath of this accord, as Tehran may view this agreement as a check on Israel’s growing influence in the region. The Biden administration was clearly attempting to broker a peace deal and the normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, an attempt to mirror how several Arab states embraced ties with the Jewish state under the socalled Abraham Accords. Previously, experts in Washington thought this might result in a greater sharing of intelligence about Iran and even the creation of a so-called “Arab NATO” as a counter to growing Iranian power. Saudi Arabia appeared to show some interest in such a deal, but it insisted that Washington should provide expanded military assistance and greater access to nuclear power technology as a “sweetener.” With Tehran serving as Israel’s key foe in the region, it is hard to imagine that Jerusalem will be able to get past this agreement in any future negotiations with Saudi Arabia.

What has China Gained?

This is the first time Beijing has sought a major diplomatic role in the Middle East and suggests China seeks to assert its position as a major global power broker while also ensuring its ties to major oil producing states. But China wants to be seen as a global peace maker as it pursues its interests. This agreement comes after the China-Gulf Summit in December when Chinese President Xi traveled to Saudi Arabia. Xi’s recent trip to Russia cemented closer Chinese-Russia ties, though with Beijing in the superior position. It was described as “a journey of peace” by Beijing and occurred only a few weeks after China announced a twelve-point peace proposal to end the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine — though Ukraine has balked at the proposal.

China has been building closer economic ties with Iran and Saudi Arabia for several years. Both are now major oil suppliers to the world’s second largest economy and peace between these two regional powers would ensure that energy supplies are not disrupted in future. Beijing has become the major buyer of Iranian crude oil since Washington withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018.

Experts believe it could result in a realignment in the region that empowers China to a newfound position of influence and status. This would be a major diplomatic success for China. But there are numerous reasons for skepticism. Saudi Arabia and Iran have been enemies for decades underscored by religious and historic enmity. It has been several weeks since the signing of the agreement, which called for the reopening of embassies in both capitals within two months and a meeting of the countries’ foreign ministers to finalize details. It will be interesting to see if this occurs along the agreed timeline in a region that is notorious for delays or if it confirms that frequently “an agreement is not implementation.”

Dueling speeches and the clash of Western priorities

President Joe Biden’s speech in Warsaw, Poland, after his historic visit to Kyiv — where he spent time with Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelenskyy — did not include any unexpected information. It was a notable statement of American support for Ukraine and U.S. allies, however, as Russian forces press forward with their latest offensive.

The image alone was a powerful one. Biden stood framed by stairways leading to Kubicki Arkades, part of the Royal Castle in Warsaw, creating a backdrop that was almost reminiscent of a presidential inauguration. With tens of thousands of people in the crowd and Beyonce and Coldplay blaring on the loudspeakers, Biden’s speech was the closest that international diplomacy comes to a rock concert. It also came a month short of the one-year anniversary of another impassioned speech Biden delivered in Warsaw in the immediate aftermath of Russia’s invasion. In both addresses he called for unity among the Western allies and a commitment to Kyiv for “as long as it takes.”

After a year of war, America and its allies’ hopes that this would be a short war have now been confronted by the realities of a long conflict whose outcome will be affected by a variety of factors. Success for U.S. priorities is far from assured, but Biden’s calls for a continued commitment to Ukraine did not ring hollow.

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s belief that Ukraine would quickly collapse has been proven wrong, Kyiv remains strong and free, and Europe is united against Russian aggression. Perhaps most importantly, Biden echoed remarks by Vice President Kamala Harris at the Wehrkunde Conference a few days earlier that Russia has committed genocide and crimes against humanity — a searing indictment of Putin. This could suggest the Biden administration seeks regime change in Russia, but it begs a critical question -- How do you negotiate with someone you hold responsible for crimes against humanity?

Biden’s speech was not designed to be a direct rebuttal to a speech Putin delivered a few hours earlier, but the images alone served as one. Putin’s speech, in contrast, was long, staid, and addressed to a crowd of orderly senior Russian political figures and members of the military. It was far from the borderline celebration that Biden enjoyed. Still the Russian leader appeared to double down in his determination to “win” and showed no hint of having any interest in negotiations.

Biden’s remarks were a muscular response that pointed a clear finger, as he identified Putin by name 10 times and even argued the former KGB agent could end the war with “one word.” The president also sought to refute Putin’s claims that the West threatened Russia or wanted to destroy the Russian Federation. What was evident was that Biden wanted to describe the conflict as a war of choice by an aggressive “craven” Russian leader — not a war against the Russian people.

In Putin’s speech, he continued his effort to reshape the narrative of the war. At its onset, he described “the special military operation” as an effort to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine, but in his latest remarks Putin described the conflict as one that was against the West and existential in character. The Russian president sought to convince his populace that this is a “people’s war” or the 21st century version of the “Great Patriotic War,” which is how Russians refer to World War II.

The Death of New START

The most troubling and remarkable item in Putin’s speech was his announcement that Russia would suspend participation in New START. Signed in Prague in 2010 as a continuation of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, New START placed a ceiling on the number of deployed warheads Russia and the U.S. could have at one time as well as a ceiling for launchers (bombers, ICBMs and missile launching nuclear submarines). This was enforced by on-site inspections and notifications requiring continuous dialogue and communications between Moscow and Washington.

Due to the COVID pandemic the last New START onsite inspection occurred in March 2020. The U.S. proposed a meeting of the consultative committee of Russian and American experts to resume inspections in November 2022. At the last moment Moscow announced it would not attend due to “technical reasons.” As a result, the State Department alerted Congress that Russia was noncompliant with the treaty. Russia continues that noncompliance with this suspension. While Putin’s move is of questionable legality, as the treaty contains no provision for either side to suspend participation, Russia is not in “material breach” of the agreement if both sides continue to cap the number of deployed warheads. The Russian Foreign Ministry said that the country intends to adhere to existing limits “within the life cycle” of the treaty, which is set to expire in 2026. Putin has said, however, that Russia will increase its nuclear forces by deploying new ICBM missiles, hypersonic missiles and nuclear submarines. Many American experts are skeptical, however, that in the aftermath of the Ukraine War that Moscow will have the resources to do so.

Still, this raises fears that Putin’s decisions could spur a nuclear arms race that the world hasn’t seen since the Cold War. For 50 years, the U.S. and Russia — the world’s two largest nuclear powers — have had an agreement in place to cap their ability to produce or deploy strategic nuclear weapons. Tensions between the two nations over the war in Ukraine has increased concerns that Russia and the U.S. will return to stockpiling nuclear weapons, as Putin seeks to use nuclear leverage in the ongoing conflict and in Russia’s relationship with the United States.

Russia is possibly in a better position to expand its nuclear capabilities because of its large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons — smaller warheads designed for use on the battlefield. The U.S., meanwhile, is in the midst of a largescale modernization of its strategic nuclear Triad and associated command and control. Since both countries have enough warheads to wipe each other off the planet, the number of weapons is less interesting than methods of delivery. That is where the U.S. could have greater flexibility and creativity through its current modernization efforts.

What Comes Next?

It remains to be seen what Congress’s priorities will be in the aftermath of these recent events. Putin’s nuclear threats could spur many U.S. lawmakers to push for more investments in nuclear weapons to enhance U.S. deterrence posture. Additional defense spending could also be split between nuclear weapons and an expansion of defensive surveillance through the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) in the aftermath of the Chinese spy balloon debacle. How the Pentagon spends the $858 billion allocated in fiscal year 2023 could be decided by other shifts in defense priorities since the start of the Ukraine war and the events of the past couple months.

These are incredibly significant considerations. The U.S. and many countries are also contemplating dramatic increases in defense spending which will place new requirements on their defense industries. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has prioritized next generation weapons, such as hypersonic missiles, cyberwarfare and artificial intelligence. Now it must once again return to the basics and examine its production of conventional weapons, such as 155mm artillery shells and mortars, which has diminished dramatically since the end of the Cold War.

Clearly, the Ukraine war will continue to have a major impact on defense, politics, diplomacy and the global economy. China, among other countries, emphasized at the UN Security Council its fear of the use of nuclear weapons or damage to nuclear power plants, such as the Zaporizhzhia facility in east Ukraine. There is also the danger of the expiration of the ongoing grain deal next month. With Turkey currently struggling in the aftermath of a series of massive earthquakes, the end of that agreement could lead to a spike in commodity prices and the threat of famine.

One final question that remains is whether there is a half-life to American support, particularly within the GOP. Senator Mitch McConnell, the Republican minority leader from Kentucky, attempted to assuage concerns by leading the largest congressional delegation to ever attend the recent Munich Security Conference. He suggested that the Republican party’s flagging support for U.S. allies “have been greatly exaggerated.” Former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, a presidential hopeful for 2024, also recently criticized the Biden administration for moving too slow in its support for Ukraine. But there are many on the far-right of the Republican party and the far-left of the Democratic party who would like to see a full U.S. withdrawal from supporting this war and moving the nation in a more isolationist direction.

But they are unlikely to find an appetite for dramatic reductions in defense spending, as both Democrats and Republicans in Congress react to growing tensions in the Pacific and conflict in Europe that will continue for a long time.

Unleash the Leopards (and the Abrams… eventually)

Ukrainian leaders have been desperate for several months to acquire additional armored vehicles especially tanks. Time is not on their side as they prepare for a spring offensive to recover territory seized by Russia, and leaders in Kyiv also realize they must be prepared to counter Russia’s own spring offensive.

The Ukrainians appear to have gotten what they wanted. After protracted negotiations with its NATO allies, the Biden administration announced it would provide Ukraine 31 M1 Abrams tanks. With the Americans’ announcement providing some political cover, Germany agreed to send 14 of its Leopard 2 tanks in a corresponding move. The Germans also announced they would provide additional tanks in future and allow other countries that had purchased their tanks in past to send them to Ukraine. The United Kingdom also intends to send 14 of its Challenger 2 tanks.

This comes after the U.S. announced $2.5 billion in additional military assistance to Ukraine that included 100 Bradley fighting vehicles and over 90 Strykers — about two brigades of combat power. The Biden administration has provided over $27 billion in military assistance thus far, including 50,000 antitank weapons, nearly 300 artillery pieces or mortars, and over one million artillery rounds.

Other NATO members — to include France, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom — have announced similar packages of armored vehicles. Armored vehicles like the Bradley are often referred to as “battlefield taxis.” They are designed to carry an infantry squad and move them rapidly on the battlefield in offensive operations or as a mobile reserve. But such vehicles are not “tanks” which are crucial if Ukraine is going to be successful in any upcoming offensive or respond to future Russian attacks.

Kyiv has maintained that tanks are key to turn the tide of the war. Western tanks will help Ukraine break through the frozen battlelines kept static by ongoing artillery battles, and the Leopards and Abrams will be a major upgrade over the Soviet-era T-72 tanks they have relied on thus far.

But Western support for Ukraine is also critical politically if Putin’s efforts to destroy Ukraine are to be thwarted. The recently announced military aid packages also mark a significant change in what the West is willing to provide. It has not come easily, as there was significant disagreement among NATO allies about providing Kyiv tanks. This centered on Germany. For months pressure has been building on Olaf Scholz, the German chancellor, to support the transfer of Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine. Made by a German firm, the Leopard 2 would substantially boost Ukraine’s offensive capabilities.

There are more than 2,000 Leopard 2s in the arsenals of 13 Western European armies, and Germany’s Bundeswehr operates around 350. That means there is a common pool of spare parts, ammunition, as well as maintenance expertise to train/sustain Ukrainian forces with this weapon. Poland, Finland, the Baltic Republics, and other NATO countries have indicated their willingness to provide Leopard 2 tanks they purchased from Germany to Ukraine. Because of end-user export controls, however, none could be transferred to Kyiv without Berlin’s agreement.

To break the logjam, the U.K. was first to announce its intentions to provide tanks. Its small number showed this was primarily political signaling, rather than solely military aid.

Washington, meanwhile, urged Germany to support Poland’s announced willingness to send its tanks to Kyiv and provide additional Leopard 2s from its own stocks. Scholtz remained reluctant unless the Biden administration was willing to provide its M1 Abrams tank. Despite arguing that the Abrams would require extensive training and maintenance and be difficult for Kyiv to operate and sustain, President Biden announced the administration had changed its mind.

Germans have a particular sensitivity to “delivering arms in regions where German arms were historically used to kill millions of people.” Ukraine was one of the most devastated areas in Europe during the Second World War and a principal battleground for Nazi and Soviet forces on the Eastern Front.

At present the chancellor is also the leader of the German Social Democratic Party (SPD) which has a long history of pursuing good relations with the Soviet Union and subsequently Russia. Its political heritage is based on former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik and policies of détente during the Cold War. Scholz’s predecessor and Germany’s longest-serving Chancellor, Angela Merkel, pursued similar policies with Russia through expanded political and economic relations.

Scholz also faced domestic political pressures from his three-party coalition. It includes pacifists who fear escalation, and many have the mistaken desire to provide Ukraine with only “defensive” rather than “offensive” weapons. He further feared making decisions alone without the backing from NATO partners, particularly the U.S. as the de facto leader of the alliance, and that crossing of socalled “redlines” with Russia could result in the Kremlin escalating the ongoing conflict. Still, a few days after the invasion Scholz had delivered a speech to the Bundestag and announced a Zeitwende or watershed moment for his nation. This major revision in future defense planning included 100 billion Euros in additional defense spending and a pledge to meet the NATO spending goal of 2 percent of GDP.

This latest diplomatic flap, however, underscores two important. First, NATO unity is essential to the West’s overall ability to halt Moscow’s aggression, and it will be tested in the months ahead which will likely be decisive. Kyiv and the West’s objectives in this conflict overlap, but they are not the same. Ukrainians complain the West seeks to provide Kyiv the capabilities to prevent Moscow from winning but not sufficient for Ukraine to achieve its objectives which is the recovery all its lost territory to include Crimea — though this may be changing.

Second, Germany must define its new role as a leader in the Alliance in the 21st century. Ultimately, can Chancellor Scholz deliver on his proposed Zeitwende and a new vision for German national security free of historical baggage? Or will the center of European security and leadership move east to countries like Poland and the Baltic States in the future?

More broadly the West must be clear eyed in its overall assessment as we approach the one-year mark in this war. Despite reports of 180,000 casualties since this war began, there is no sign Putin is seeking an end to the conflict. Russia is preparing for a long war and placing its economy on a war footing. It is reported in Vedomosti, the Russian business daily, that Putin describes the work of the Russian military-industrial complex as an essential factor in Moscow’s ultimate victory.

At the same time the Biden administration must also recognize the dramatic geopolitical changes that have occurred since this war began. The war in Ukraine is hardly an isolated event, and the global landscape has changed inextricably. Tensions in Asia continue to grow. The debate over tanks is symptomatic of broader geostrategic challenges focused on American industrial capacity. Can the United States increase its industrial capacity to meet all emerging global requirements? Its announcement to spend billions of dollars over the next 15 years to expand conventional munitions productions seems to suggest this is a new focus.

This may also have a significant geopolitical impact. Some in Germany fear American defense industries will benefit from the transfer of the Leopard 2 to Ukraine. They worry Washington will seek to sell the M1 Abrams tank to those European states to replace the Leopard 2s they provide Kyiv. Earlier this month Poland announced a second agreement to purchase 116 Abrams at a cost of $1.4 billion. This deal follows last year's $4.7 billion agreement for the acquisition of 250 upgraded M1A2 Abrams tanks scheduled for delivery in 2025-26. Poland is also awaiting delivery of American HIMARS artillery systems and has already received Patriot missile batteries.

Many other American allies have announced significant increases in defense spending that will result in dramatic increases in American foreign military sales. If both Germany and Japan reach their recently stated goals of spending two percent of GDP for defense this would translate into $140 billion per year for Tokyo and $90 billion for Berlin. Japan would then have the third largest defense budget on the planet and Germany would be fourth. French President Macron also announced his nation would increase defense spending by 40% over the next few years. This would be 60 billion Euros annually or roughly what is spent by Russian Federation.

But as the world becomes an increasingly dangerous place there are open questions on whether American congressional leadership is up to the emerging challenge. Can Washington find the proper balance between strategic goals and the means to achieve them?