For all the geopolitical fanfare that surrounds the U.S.-India relationship — the shared democratic identity, the pivot to Asia, common concerns about an aggressive China — this remains a partnership with limits. It is forged more by converging interests than shared grand strategies. It is stable, but brittle. Warm, but cautious. And after the 2025 Pahalgam crisis, it faces its most intense test yet.
The U.S.-India relationship matters already, and its importance will grow in the future. India is the world’s fastest-growing major economy. It’s critical to global supply chains, arms trade, and regional maritime stability. But India is also increasingly nationalistic, militarily assertive, resistant to external influence (including from Washington), and in many ways encumbered by its past.
As the recent crisis in Kashmir revealed, the U.S. may believe India is a cornerstone of its evolving Indo-Pacific strategy. But India doesn’t see itself as a cornerstone of anything but its own grand design. And, sadly, its inability to establish a stable relationship with Pakistan may threaten Washington’s ability and willingness to expand relations.
A Strategic Partnership Built on an Uneven Foundation
The United States has courted India for two decades. That effort began in earnest with George W. Bush’s civil nuclear agreement, was deepened by Barack Obama’s outreach and trade overtures, and was personalized by Donald Trump’s bombastic friendship with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
Each administration saw India as a long-term hedge against China. And from a geopolitical perspective, the pieces appear to have fallen into place: the Quad (with Australia and Japan), increased arms sales, tech partnerships, and joint military exercises like Yudh Abhyas and Malabar. But convergence is not cohesion. India remains outside every formal U.S.-led security alliance, has refused to join sanctions on Russia for its invasion of Ukraine, continues to buy arms from Moscow, and pursues a strategy of non-alignment as a leader of the BRICS group.
Indian leaders describe this as “strategic autonomy.” For American defense planners, it looks like hedging, ambiguity, or outright defiance. Both views are true. As CFR analysts Tanvi Madan and Charles Edel note, “the two countries continue to diverge in their comfort with operational integration, command-and-control norms, and the level of political risk they are willing to accept.”
This divergence has consequences which were clearly displayed during the recent terrorist attack in Kashmir and the crisis that followed.
Technology, Trade, and the Autonomy Dilemma
The U.S. and India are increasingly entwined economically. Bilateral trade has surged to over $190 billion annually. India is a key market for American defense contractors, semiconductors, and clean energy components. The two countries are working on joint ventures in jet engine manufacturing, AI, and 5G/6G standards. Yet frictions persist.
India has bristled at U.S. export controls on sensitive tech, particularly dual-use items. Washington, in turn, remains wary of Indian data localization laws, tariffs, and a protectionist streak that undermines the goal of building stable, resilient supply chains.
This is a relationship shaped by ambition on both sides but is constrained by philosophy and history. Nowhere is this clearer than in the tech sector:
● Space cooperation has been uneven. India wants deeper engagement with NASA and U.S. private firms but resists oversight. Its ambition to be a spacefaring power has led to a clear misalignment with U.S. norms.
● On semiconductors, the U.S. has designated India as a “trusted partner,” but India’s sluggish bureaucratic environment and preference for indigenous manufacturing have slowed progress.
● The Biden administration’s push for friend-shoring and supply chain diversification aligned well with India’s economic rise, but less so with its appetite for binding legal commitments or labor reforms. Still, this could change under the Trump administration.
Defense Ties: Strong on Paper, Thin in Practice
U.S.-India military cooperation is deeper than it’s ever been. The two nations have signed foundational pacts like the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), allowing encrypted communications and geospatial intelligence sharing. U.S. aircraft carriers have conducted joint patrols with the Indian Navy in the Bay of Bengal. But India continues to resist alliance-like structures. It wants access to U.S. capabilities without dependency and with maximum operational independence.
This reveals a central truth: the U.S. may see India as a pillar of regional security, but India sees itself as an independent pole in a multipolar world. That distinction could define the next decade. This all became especially visible during the 2025 India-Pakistan standoff, when New Delhi acted decisively without consulting Washington. The crisis escalated quickly, and a nuclear confrontation between Delhi and Islamabad appeared possible. In the aftermath the underlying issues remains unresolved, conflict could easily reignite, and Indian leaders seem resigned (and enthusiastic in some cases) that future confrontations with Pakistan are inevitable.
On April 22, 2025, five gunmen attacked Hindu pilgrims near Pahalgam in Indian-administered Kashmir. Twenty-six civilians were killed. The Indian government immediately blamed Pakistan-backed militants and accused Islamabad of providing them support. Similar terrorist attacks have occurred in past. The most recent was 2019 when over 40 Indian paramilitaries were killed in Kashmir. Within hours of this most recent assault, India suspended a decades-old water-sharing treaty that governs the Indus River — which is critical to Pakistan’s agricultural survival. Diplomatic relations were downgraded, trade was halted, and visa regimes were revoked.
Dramatic escalation followed, and India launched “Operation Sindoor” on May 7. India struck nine alleged militant camps in Pakistan as well as Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. What New Delhi described as “limited strikes” then escalated. Indian drones attacked radar installations, and missiles hit sites near Pakistan’s nuclear command headquarters.
Pakistan retaliated consistent with its “Quid Pro Quo Plus” doctrine, launching counterstrikes against Indian territory, downing both Indian drones and aircraft. Islamabad reportedly mobilized conventional forces and cyber assets. Both sides engaged in a multi-domain battle — air, cyber, information warfare — with the Line of Control that divides Kashmir becoming a battle area.
Notably, this was the first time both sides conducted attacks across international borders since the 1971 war, and it was the first time cyber operations and social media disinformation became important parts of the overall conflict. The Trump administration was initially hands-off, and Vice President Vance underscored this view when he said that it was “none of our business.” But as fears of a nuclear confrontation grew with the potential for catastrophic consequences, Washington was pulled into the crisis. Secretary of State Marco Rubio and diplomats from Turkey and Saudi Arabia helped mediate a ceasefire that was announced on May 10 — which has largely held thus far.
But the U.S. role was reactive, not leading. This is a critical lesson because the next crisis will begin where Pahalgam ended.
India’s Assertive Turn and What It Means for Washington
As they have done in past both sides sought to describe what had occurred as “victory” to their respective populations. But India’s response to the Pahalgam attack was different than in 2019 or 1999. It was faster, broader, and more aggressive. In the aftermath Modi publicly declared that any future terrorist attack would be treated as an act of war — and that “all of Pakistan is fair game.” That’s not just rhetoric. It’s a strategic shift with potentially dramatic consequences.
This reflects India’s growing confidence, both economically and militarily. It also reflects the influence of Israel’s campaign in Gaza, which the Modi government studied closely. The Indian prime minister believes that the international community will now allow greater latitude in responding to state-sponsored terrorism. India also appears more willing to test Pakistan’s nuclear redlines than in past — and may believe U.S. intervention will always keep things from going too far.
That’s a dangerous assumption. The Stability-Instability Paradox — the theory that nuclear deterrence makes low-level conflict more likely — only holds when both sides want to avoid full-scale war. If one side becomes convinced its opponent is bluffing, the paradox collapses.
Washington must grapple with this new reality. Indian leaders appear convinced that a future conflict with Pakistan is inevitable and are increasingly willing for their nation to assert itself militarily, economically, and diplomatically. That assertiveness might well benefit U.S. interests in containing China but could also destabilize the world’s most volatile nuclear flashpoint.
Lessons for U.S. Policy
What can Washington learn from the crisis and from the broader trajectory of this relationship?
● Time is not on your side.
In the aftermath of the Pahalgam crisis, the populations of both nations celebrated their “victory” in true populist style. But Indian and Pakistani leaders appear resigned that a future conflict is inevitable. Washington must aggressively pursue a strategy of diplomatic mediation to reduce if not eliminate this from occurring.
● Don’t assume alignment is the same as influence
India will continue to act independently — even in crises. The U.S. must build influence not through pressure, but through joint ventures, R&D partnerships, and trusted defense/diplomatic channels.
● Institutionalize crisis coordination
The 2025 ceasefire was brokered without ambassadors on the ground. That’s unacceptable. The United States must immediately staff its embassies in New Delhi and Islamabad and create standing diplomatic channels for real-time coordination that will also provide benefits economically as well as diplomatically.
● Support India’s rise, but without misconceptions
India is indispensable in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. But it is not an ally in the traditional sense. It will not agree to a NATO-style obligations. U.S. policy must be flexible. It must focus on deterrence, interoperability, and regional de-risking.
● Address emerging risks: Water, cyber, and tactical nuclear weapons
The crisis exposed new fault lines. Water disputes are increasingly existential. Cyber warfare is now a front-line tactic. And Pakistan’s arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons could potentially compress decision-making time in a future conflict. The United States must invest in early-warning, cyber forensics, and water diplomacy.
● Prepare for a “two-front” future
China’s vocal and military support for Pakistan during the crisis was significant, and its continued military presence in Ladakh create a nightmare scenario for India — a two-front war. The U.S. must help India shore up its northern defenses with intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance support, joint-surveillance platforms, and hardened logistics infrastructure.
Conclusion: The Peril and Promise of Strategic Autonomy
The future of U.S.-India relations won’t be defined by ideology. It will be defined by what each side is willing to do for the other when interests overlap, when tensions rise, and when events spiral faster than diplomacy can keep pace.
This remains a partnership of ambition and boundaries. India will not abandon its ties to Russia overnight, it will not sign binding security guarantees, and it will not allow U.S. oversight of its strategic decision-making. That’s not an American diplomatic failure, but it is a reality.
The United States also isn’t abandoning Pakistan. History and geography are keeping the two countries together, particularly in light of the Israel-Iran conflict. It should not be missed that Trump hosted Pakistan’s army chief Field Marshall Asim Munir — who says Trump deserves a Nobel Prize for averting “nuclear war between India and Pakistan” — for lunch on 18 June.
The questions for Washington are who it favors and whether it can accept India as a partner that acts independently, sometimes impulsively, but shares long-term strategic objectives. If it can, then India will be a pillar of an emerging regional order. If it cannot, then the United States risks losing an important part of its Indo-Pacific strategy.
South Asia remains a tinderbox, and perhaps the most dangerous place on a very troubled planet. If missiles strike urban centers or water resources are weaponized, the consequences could rapidly become global. One peer-reviewed study estimates that even a “limited” nuclear war between India and Pakistan could kill 21 million people immediately and trigger a global climate catastrophe akin to a nuclear winter.
In the wake of the Pahalgam crisis, the stakes are now clearer than ever.