The American airstrike against Iran — codenamed Operation Midnight Hammer — was, in operational terms, a masterclass in the focused use of military power. In the early hours of 22 June 2025, seven B-2 stealth bombers carrying 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs, supported by submarine-launched cruise missiles and over 120 other aircraft, struck Iran’s most fortified and important nuclear facilities at Fordo, Natanz, and Isfahan. The targets were chosen with surgical precision. No American personnel or aircraft were lost.
The strike was executed under the shadow of the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel, a conflict in which Israeli forces had already inflicted severe damage on Tehran’s air defenses and missile launchers. In a coordinated series of blows, Israeli strikes killed dozens of senior Iranian military officers and nuclear scientists. Iran’s vaunted proxy deterrent network, anchored by Hezbollah, had previously been badly degraded.
The immediate military verdict is clear: this was a devastating, high-tempo strike that neutralized key nuclear infrastructure and struck at the heart of Iran’s overall strategic capacity. But military success does not automatically translate into strategic victory.
President Donald Trump’s stated goal was not regime change. The administration conveyed to Tehran that the strike was limited in scope, designed to cripple nuclear capabilities without opening a wider war. Whether that restraint now yields the strategic results Washington wants—or merely buys Iran time to adapt—will define the legacy of Operation Midnight Hammer.
The real question is not what was destroyed, but what happens next?
The Damage Done, and the Questions That Remain
The strike was classified as an “air strike,” not an extended “campaign.” That is more than a semantic distinction. Without a follow-on battle damage assessment (BDA) designed to guide subsequent airstrikes, there is uncertainty about how thoroughly Iran’s facilities were rendered inoperable and its overall nuclear capabilities reduced.
Some analysts believe Fordo’s deeply buried enrichment facilities were destroyed. Others argue that absent full post-strike access, it’s impossible to know whether critical machinery, or enriched uranium stocks, survived. That is where the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) becomes crucial. This agency, empowered under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), conducts inspections of nuclear sites globally. In fact, its inspectors had reviewed Iran’s facilities just a few days before the attack, and the agency shared findings that Israel used as its reasoning to launch its attack on Iran. But now Tehran has now suspended cooperation entirely, voting in parliament to ban inspectors unless the Supreme National Security Council approves access. Without IAEA eyes on the ground, estimates of Iran’s “nuclear clock” become guesswork — and the possibility that Iran could reestablish its nuclear program cannot be ruled out.
For example, even if Fordo’s centrifuges were destroyed, a major question hangs over the fate of 800 pounds of uranium enriched to 60% purity, dangerously close to weapons-grade. Some believe this active material was destroyed in the strikes. But given the growing risk of attack, many find it implausible Tehran would leave such material in place.
As James Acton of the Carnegie Endowment warns, a single cascade of 174 IR-6 centrifuges could turn that stockpile into a bomb’s worth of 90% enriched uranium in as little as 10–20 days. Iran would not need to rebuild its entire enrichment network, just enough capacity to weaponize the material it may already possess.
Israel’s campaign of targeted killings —11 nuclear scientists during the “Twelve Day War”— has also thinned the ranks of Iran’s elite technical corps. But Iran’s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, when the United States helped the Shah establish it as part of the “Atoms for Peace” program. Technical expertise is deeply embedded across multiple generations of scientists and engineers. Knowledge, unlike centrifuges, cannot be destroyed by an airstrike.
Tehran’s remaining missile inventory, estimated at more than 1,500 ballistic and cruise missiles, also remains significant. Many could be adapted for nuclear delivery. Its regional proxy network is damaged but not destroyed. Hezbollah’s suffered 45% casualties and massive arms losses and will take years to recover. The Houthis have seen significant disruption to their supply lines for weapons. But Iran’s capacity to project power via non-state actors is resilient, and the strategic depth they provide has not disappeared. On this front, Iran is down but certainly not out.
At home, post-strike Iran is a nation in distress. Inflation officially stands at 39%, but it is likely much higher. Power outages, water shortages, and sporadic explosions (widely attributed to Mossad) are wearing down public patience. The regime is also facing a looming leadership transition. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is now 85 and in poor health. He has outlasted every contemporary in the region but cannot outlast time.
Yet authoritarian systems under siege can be paradoxically resistant. The attack may engender a degree of “rallying around the flag” among the population. Tehran’s leaders may also seek to reframe the attack as proof that nuclear capability is the only true deterrent, doubling down on the very path the strike sought to block.
The Strategic Choices for Washington
The United States remains committed, at least officially, to preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The secondary goal is equally ambitious: leveraging a weakened Iran to advance broader regional stability, including potential Saudi-Israeli normalization, which could eventually allow a reduced U.S. military footprint in the Middle East.
How to get there is less clear. The administration has three broad options:
Option 1: Diplomacy – “Son of JCPOA”
In theory, the strike could open space for diplomacy by forcing Iran to negotiate from a position of weakness. But Tehran’s opening conditions are unlikely to appeal to Washington:
1. The right to enrich uranium up to 3.67% on Iranian soil, as allowed under the NPT.
2. A U.S. pledge not to attack during negotiations.
Trump’s team is unlikely to accept enrichment on Iranian territory, given the ease of scaling to weapons-grade. Washington will also insist on constraints on Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and its support for proxies, which are red lines for Tehran. Even if a framework were agreed, unprecedented verification would be required.
One possible middle ground — a regional enrichment consortium operating outside Iran — has been floated for years but lacks momentum. Without a major shift in either side’s position, a revived JCPOA-style agreement remains a long shot.
Option 2: “Mowing the Grass”
Borrowing from Israeli security doctrine, Washington and Jerusalem could adopt a strategy of periodic strikes to prevent nuclear breakout, coupled with relentless intelligence monitoring. This would mean keeping substantial forces in the region, accepting an indefinite cycle of preemptive blows, and managing the risk of escalation.
The advantage: Iran’s program stays in check.
The cost: The U.S. remains militarily and politically tied to a volatile theater indefinitely.
Option 3: Muddling Through
This hybrid approach acknowledges that the strike likely set back Iran’s nuclear timeline by roughly two years. The U.S. could open talks but on stringent terms, maintain current economic sanctions, and support the France, Germany, and the United Kingdom’s planned UN “snapback sanctions” — arms embargoes, travel bans, and asset freezes — with a mid-October implementation deadline. In parallel, Washington could signal privately to Tehran that any acceleration toward a weapon would trigger another strike.
The hope: internal Iranian political change, including succession after Khamenei, might yield a more pliable negotiating partner over time.
The risk: Iran uses the lull to reconstitute its program clandestinely.
The Global Ripple Effects
The decimation of Iran’s nuclear program — at least temporarily — and the severe blow to its proxies coincide with broader regional shifts. Syria’s internal revolution, Hezbollah’s losses, and the prospect of Saudi-Israeli normalization create an opening for a new security architecture in the Middle East. Some analysts liken this moment to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, a potential inflection point toward lasting stability. Others warn it could as easily tip into renewed instability, as regional actors recalibrate power balances in unpredictable ways.
Much of this change has been driven by Israel’s response to Hamas’ October 7 attack. Their effort to neutralize Iran regionally has been effective. While U.S. and Israeli objectives overlap, they are not identical. Washington’s priority is preventing nuclear breakout while avoiding a wider war; Prime Minister Netanyahu may view renewed strikes as necessary regardless of diplomatic timelines. Divergence here could complicate U.S. efforts to broker a settlement.
Meanwhile, Iran may decide to withdraw from the NPT which would prevent subsequent IAEA inspections. This would deliver a severe blow to the global nonproliferation framework. Other states, particularly in the Middle East and Asia, may also interpret the U.S. strike as evidence that nuclear latency invites attack, reinforcing incentives to build clandestine capabilities.
The strikes have also affected America’s reputation on the global stage. Russia and China condemned the attack and described it as U.S. aggression. But neither rushed to provide Iran material aid. Moscow may now deepen military cooperation with Tehran, including missile technology transfers, as a counterweight to U.S. influence. Beijing — balancing energy interests in the Gulf — could seek to be a potential mediator, challenging Washington’s diplomatic primacy.
The Next Moves Will Decide the Legacy
Operation Midnight Hammer delivered an unambiguous military win. But its strategic value hinges on what follows. If Washington can leverage Iran’s weakened state into verifiable constraints on its nuclear program, the strike could be remembered as a decisive move that opened a pathway to greater regional stability.
If, however, the U.S. drifts into either an indefinite cycle of “mowing the grass” or a muddled status quo, Iran may reemerge more determined, and perhaps closer to the bomb.
In the coming weeks, three developments will dominate the calculus:
1. Iran’s stance on IAEA inspections and continued NPT membership.
2. The European’s decision on snapback sanctions in October.
3. Internal Iranian leadership changes as succession looms.
Every U.S. option carries risks. But the one certainty is that the Middle East, like the global order, is at an inflection point. Whether this moment tilts toward stability or renewed upheaval depends less on what the B-2s destroyed than on the policy built in their wake.