German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock opened this year’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in New York with a sobering warning: this is “no ordinary session.” The phrase was more than rhetorical. It captured a deeper truth that both world leaders and those they represent are now confronting—that the multilateral system, long taken for granted as a stabilizing force, is under unprecedented strain.
For years, the annual assembly has been seen as diplomatic theater. But in 2025, with wars raging, the climate crisis deepening, and great-power rivalry reshaping the global economy, UNGA has become a test of whether international governance can adapt—or whether power will fragment into competing blocs. With the rules of the so-called “rulesbased order” now no longer honored in the observance or in the breach, the stakes are no longer abstract. The outcomes and failures of this year’s assembly will shape trade policy, energy markets, sanctions compliance, ongoing and future conflicts and the durability of the institutions that underpin global governance and economics.
A Global Context of Conflict and Fragmentation
The geopolitical backdrop could scarcely be more volatile. Russia’s war in Ukraine grinds into its fourth year. At least 19 Kremlin drones entered Polish airspace earlier this month, which has raised questions for the NATO alliance as Europe begins a long-term rearmament effort. The war in Gaza has expanded into a regional conflict spanning Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Yemen, and most recently Qatar, where an Israeli airstrike ignored diplomatic norms to target Hamas leaders. Meanwhile, the United States has struck boats departing Venezuela that President Donald Trump claims were carrying illegal narcotics supported by the Venezuelan government. The White House has not provided its legal justification, the parameters of its authority, or the information it used to draw its conclusions. All three of these events have pushed the boundaries of global order, and they all occurred within one week of September.
But that’s not all. The Sudan is experiencing one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, and East Asia remains tense, with Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula all potential flashpoints. The accelerating climate crisis only sharpens these global risks. Floods in South Asia, wildfires in Europe, and relentless heat in North America underscore how environmental shocks can amplify instability.
Overlaying all of this is a U.S. foreign policy recalibration. Trump has pulled the United States back from its role as global steward, preferring bilateral leverage over multilateral compromise. That retreat has provided openings for China, Russia, and others to promote their vision of a multipolar order, framed as resistance to “Western hegemony.”
The UN at a Crossroads: The UN80 Initiative
Against this backdrop, Secretary-General António Guterres unveiled the UN80 Initiative, a reform plan timed to coincide with the organization’s eightieth anniversary. His proposals seek to address inefficiency, duplication, and declining credibility. It also will potentially address a growing budgetary crisis, particularly as countries like the United States withhold or withdraw funding.
The initiative centers on three workstreams:
1. Efficiency and Cost Cutting: A proposed 20 percent reduction in the Secretariat’s $3.7 billion budget for 2026, implying nearly 7,000 job losses. Consolidation of back-office functions and workforce streamlining are part of the package.
2. Mandate Review: Evaluation of more than 3,600 Secretariat mandates to eliminate redundancies and focus resources on pressing challenges such as climate change and humanitarian relief.
3. Structural Reconfiguration: Merging overlapping agencies—such as integrating UNAIDS into the WHO or consolidating climate bodies—and relocating some headquarters closer to field operations.
The drivers are clear: donor fatigue, $2.4 billion in arrears (with $1.5 billion owed by the U.S.), and skepticism about the UN’s relevance in the face of Security Council paralysis. The obstacles are formidable. Great powers resist reforms that dilute their influence— ask any country that isn’t on the UN Security Council. It is also worth noting that Guterres’s term as Secretary General expires in 2026, limiting his window to effect UN80 and opening the possibility of a major change in UN leadership.
Developing states worry that spending cuts will reduce access to aid. An effective UN can enforce sanctions, coordinate humanitarian aid, and mitigate conflict risks. A weakened UN amplifies volatility, compliance uncertainty, and the drift toward regional fragmentation.
Items to Watch at a Strained UNGA
Trump at the UN. The U.S. president will give an address on Tuesday, September 23, which world leaders will watch in hopes of gleaning how large a step the United States intends to take away from global leadership. Trump’s previous UN speeches have attacked “globalism” and championed sovereignty. His trade deals, which have targeted allies as well as adversaries, have only underlined this perspective.
Many leaders will attempt to have pull-asides with Trump at the UN. Ukrainian President Zelenskyy has reportedly been working hard to gain an audience with the president.
But this year, the real signal to watch may come from a possible meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. U.S.-India relations remain strained by tariffs, digital trade disputes, and market-access barriers. Yet India’s role as the world’s fastestgrowing large economy and a strategic counterweight to China makes it indispensable. Progress toward a trade deal could boost investor confidence in India’s integration into supply chains. Failure would reinforce the narrative of U.S. retrenchment and strengthen China’s hand in South Asia. Xi Jinping has already begun to make significant inroads with his Indian counterpart.
Palestinian Statehood: A Diplomatic Earthquake. The expected recognition of Palestinian statehood by France, Canada, the UK, and Australia will mark a diplomatic watershed. For the first time, G7 members—and two permanent members of the Security Council—would formally recognize Palestine statehood which is contrary to American policy. The Trump administration has blocked the entire Palestinian delegation from receiving visas to attend. The UN has voted to allow Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to speak to the General Assembly via video instead.
The timing is best described as combustible. The Gaza war has become regional, humanitarian conditions are dire, and public pressure in Western capitals is mounting. The “New York Declaration,” to be presented at UNGA, outlines a 15-month roadmap toward demilitarized sovereignty, peacekeeping, and elections. Meanwhile, a UN inquiry just concluded that Israel is committing a genocide in the Gaza Strip. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will likely harangue the General Assembly for this finding, though he has also acknowledged that his country has a decreasing number of friends and allies. He has also claimed that he will have a meeting with Trump after while in the U.S.
It is unlikely that any of these efforts will change the status quo significantly. The Trump administration is unwilling to pressure Israel to bring the war to a conclusion, and countries’ recognition of a Palestinian state will not suddenly lead to a two-state solution. Consequently, it is up to the Israelis to address the situation and decide how to proceed. Recognition won’t change the situation much, but it could alter the diplomatic baseline and create conditions for either renewed negotiations or deeper polarization.
Iran: The Return of Snapback Sanctions. The E3 (France, Germany, UK) are poised to invoke “snapback” UN sanctions against Iran after Tehran barred IAEA inspectors in the wake of the twelve-day war with Israel and U.S. strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Restoring these sanctions would restrict Iranian oil exports and heighten compliance risks for shipping, insurance, and finance. Energy markets would tighten further, feeding inflationary pressures. For investors, Iran remains a core source of volatility.
Regional Counterweights: SCO and BRICS Step Forward
Even as the UN attempts reform, regional organizations are advancing their agendas. Both the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS held consequential meetings this year, underscoring the shift toward multipolarity.
Together, the SCO and BRICS illustrate a trend: regional and limited multi-national organizations are rising as the UN struggles. They are not yet substitutes for the UN’s legitimacy or reach, but they are building alternative institutions, norms, and financing channels.
This means fragmentation, competing regulatory regimes, increased compliance costs, and geopolitical uncertainty. There are also opportunities, however, with new development finance, alternative trade corridors, and local-currency instruments that may gain traction in emerging markets.
SCO’s Tianjin Summit. Originally founded to manage border disputes, the SCO now includes China, Russia, India, Iran, and Pakistan. At its 2025 Tianjin summit (30 August thru 1 September), leaders called for a new international order more aligned with the Global South. Beijing pledged ¥2 billion in free aid and ¥10 billion in loans through an SCO banking consortium, while proposing an SCO Development Bank. The group also discussed alternative payment systems to reduce dependence on the dollar.
Russia, once reluctant to accept Chinese leadership, now openly backs Beijing. This reflects Moscow’s growing dependence since the onset of the Ukraine war. India’s Modi visited China for the first time in seven years at this summit, signaling both a tentative rapprochement and increasing economic interdependence.
The SCO’s diversity complicates consensus, and concrete implementation mechanisms remain vague. Still, the summit highlighted how China is using the bloc to build influence and offer institutional alternatives to the West.
BRICS Summit: Ambition and Limits. In July 2025, BRICS leaders—Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and partners—met to chart a more equitable world order. Their declaration emphasized reform of the IMF and World Bank, with greater Global South representation, and proposed shifting international tax cooperation from the OECD to the UN. The New Development Bank (NDB) is considering a “multilateral guarantee mechanism” akin to World Bank.
Reducing dollar dependence was another theme. Members committed to expanding local-currency settlements and deepening trade ties, though none sought to replace the dollar outright. But Trump’s tariff policies have reinforced the bloc’s motivation to diversify.
Internal divisions—particularly between India and China—persist, but cooperation has grown as well. Infrastructure and development financing across the Global South could redirect capital flows, while incremental de-dollarization steps chip away at U.S. financial dominance.
A Stress Test for Multilateralism
Baerbock’s warning was apt: this is no ordinary UN General Assembly session. The 2025 UNGA is a stress test for multilateralism, a forum in the West and the rules-based order have long depended upon. If reforms gain traction and diplomacy yields progress, the UN could reclaim relevance. If not, regional blocs like SCO and BRICS will continue to fill the vacuum, fragmenting governance and complicating the global economic and diplomatic climate.
While UNGA has not always been the most interesting event to Americans in past, this year could change that. It has been many decades since the UN could claim such relevance. That is why the upcoming debates and decisions in New York are not optional—they are essential. UN Secretary General Guterres has described the UNGA as the “World Cup of diplomacy,” but it cannot be solely about “scoring points.” It must also be prepared to solve global problems. The stakes are too high.